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Abstract
Hedge funds have specialized fee structures, often including performance fees designed
to align the incentives of investors and fund managers. However, hedge funds have faced in-
tense scrutiny since the financial crisis, as the fees they charge investors have been outsized
compared to the returns. Consequently, innovative fee structures have emerged aiming at
better alignment between investors’ interests and the hedge fund business objective. In
this thesis, we present mathematical and numerical analyses of many aspects of hedge fund
investments with three fee structures, first-loss, shared-loss and negative fee structure. The
motivation for this is to understand an important new investment type and its implications
for investors and managers, as well as the mathematical problems that it poses.
In Chapter 2 and 3, we investigate the optimal withdrawal time of a first-loss or shared-
loss hedge fund fee structure from an investor’s perspective. Given that a hedge fund
dynamic follows a geometric Brownian, calculating the optimal withdrawal time entails
solving an optimal stopping problem with a continuous piece-wise linear payoff function.
In particular, we explicitly solve the problem in the infinite horizon case. Next, we show
that there exist two monotonic and continuous early exercise boundaries and derive an early
exercise premium integral representation in the finite horizon case. Finally, we analyze the
asymptotic behavior of the early exercise boundaries near maturity.
In Chapter 4, we test the hypothesis of fee diversification. In particular, we study the
optimization problem of an investor who may choose any combination of the first loss and
classical fee structures, and seeks to maximize either the Sharpe ratio or the Sortino ratio
of their final payoff, evaluated using real-world probabilities. We demonstrate that for the
vast majority of fund mean returns and volatilities, there is no fee diversification effect:
either the first-loss structure or the classical structure is optimal for the investor.
In Chapter 5, we present an analysis of the value and risks for negative fee structure. We
begin by employing risk-neutral valuation, using both Black-Scholes and regime-switching
models. We then proceed to analyze the risks inherent in investments in hedge funds
with negative fee structures. Given the resemblance of these investments to asset-backed
securities, we in particular study probability of default and loss given default under the
real-world measure for both geometric Brownian motion and regime-switching models.
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The global hedge fund industry has increased tremendously in size and popularity over
the past decades. According to the database of BarclayHedge, a total of 3194 billion
dollars of assets under management is reported to the database at the first Quarter 2019
(BarclayHedge, 2019). Investors embraced hedge funds due to their ability to generate
absolute return, their outstanding historical performance, and their diversification potential
with respect to an existing portfolio (see, e.g. Vogt (2010) and Meucci (2007)). As a
consequence, both academics and practitioners have studied several aspects of hedge fund
investments.
Hedge funds are private investment vehicles controlled by a small number of partners
with limited partnership. They exploit possible investment opportunities by taking long
and short positions, using leverage, hedging with financial derivatives and investing in
various markets. In most cases, performance-based fees are included to align the managers’
and the investors’ interests (Lhabitant, 2007; Vogt, 2010). As such, modern hedge funds
have deviated significantly from the original purpose of the investment type, which was
hedging risks (Lhabitant, 2001). Nevertheless, hedge funds have increased in popularity
due to several important factors.
First, as Liang (1999) points out, hedge fund managers are absolute performers, who
target benchmarks, such as the T-bill rate (with a possible premium) or LIBOR rate (with
a possible premium). These benchmarks are often viewed as risk-free assets with positive
returns. Thus, investors anticipate that hedge funds will earn positive returns regardless
1
of the market environment. On the other hand, traditional mutual fund managers are
relative performers as they measure their performance with respect to market benchmarks
or indices, such as the S&P 500 index (Liang, 1999; Vogt, 2010). Generally, negative
returns are acceptable for these managers as long as they outperform the corresponding
benchmarks.
Second, hedge funds are more flexible in their investment strategies than many other
investment vehicles. In order to protect investors, many potential competitors for invest-
ment capital, such as mutual funds, are strictly regulated by government agencies. In
contrast, hedge funds are only subject to light regulations in most jurisdictions (Fung and
Hsieh, 1999). For example, hedge fund managers can take long and short positions, while
traditional mutual fund managers are often only permitted long-only strategies. Moreover,
hedge fund managers are able to use substantial leverage to increase investment capital
and to purchase various financial derivatives, such as options and swaps (Vogt, 2010).
Third, investors can further diversify a stock/bond portfolio by treating hedge funds as
a possible asset class. For example, Kooli (2007) finds that by combining a hedge fund or
fund of funds (FOF) with bonds and stocks there is a significant statistical improvement
of the global minimum-variance portfolio. Furthermore, even when investors expand their
asset universe to include commodities, fixed income, and international assets, the FOF can
still provide a statistically significant diversification potential. These results are intuitive
since Fung and Hsieh (1997) demonstrate that hedge fund returns are often negatively
correlated or weakly correlated to traditional “buy-and-hold” mutual fund returns.
Last but not least, hedge funds have specialized fee structures, often including fees
designed to align the incentives of investors and fund managers. Traditionally, the fee
structure of a hedge fund consists of two parts: a management fee and a performance
fee. The management fee is charged as a percentage of assets under management, and the
performance fee is charged as a percentage of profits. For instance, a common fee structure
is “two and twenty” (a fee consisting of 2% of assets under management and 20% of profits).
The performance fee is supposed to motivate the hedge fund manager to seek high absolute
returns rather than following passive trading strategies or purchasing indexed funds. There
has been significant research into the question of whether performance fees indeed align the
interests of investors and fund managers in practice. Because the performance-based fee
induces a call option-like contract on the assets that the manager controls, it seems that
the manager will invest in a riskier portfolio. However, Carpenter (2000) demonstrates that
the risk of a portfolio can decrease when a manager with option-like compensation chooses
to maximize their expected power utility. On the contrary, Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2007)
show that the manager can increase the fund’s risk when their preference is modeled by
prospect theory, depending on the level of the manager’s own investment in the fund.
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Hedge funds have faced intense scrutiny since the financial crisis, as the fees they
charge investors have been outsized compared to the returns they are posting as a group.1
Consequently, innovative fee structures have emerged aiming at better alignment between
investors’ interests and the hedge fund business objectives. An example is the class of first-
loss fee structures (Banzaca, 2012). In these structures, in return for a higher performance
fee, the hedge fund manager provides some downside protection to the investors on their
losses. The loss coverage is typically around 10%, while the performance fee can reach
40% or even 50% of profits. He and Kou (2018) present a description, and a mathematical
analysis of the incentives that such a fee structure provokes, and study the impact on the
utility of both the hedge fund manager and investor. Djerroud et al. (2016) analyze the
first-loss fee structure using an option-pricing perspective, leading to the identification of
fair levels of the performance fee. Fee innovation has led to discussions and negotiations
between investors and managers on the optimal fee to be used in certain situations, ampli-
fying the universe of available fee structures by mixing different structures together. One
example is the shared-loss structure, which can be considered as a mixture of the classical
structure and the first-loss structure. Under a shared-loss agreement, rather than covering
all investor losses up to a certain limit, the manager will provide compensation for a pro-
portion of the investor’s losses (again subject to a ceiling). To draw an (imperfect) analogy
with insurance, in the first loss structure, the manager provides full insurance on losses
(up to a preset limit), while in the shared loss structure the manager is providing partial
insurance.
In this thesis, we present mathematical and numerical analyses of many aspects of hedge
fund investments with shared-loss fee structures. The motivation for this is to understand
an important new investment type and its implications for investors and managers, as well
as the mathematical problems that it poses. It further serves as a case study of a situation
in which compensation is provided through a portfolio of options, and an opportunity to
analyze the resulting payoffs and the incentives that they provoke. Similar situations, with
related payoffs, arise for example in variable annuities offered by insurers (Lin et al., 2017).
The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. In the second
section, we discuss the payoffs of first-loss and shared-loss fee structures. In the third
section, we summarize the problems studied and the novel research contributions of this




1.2 Hedge Fund Fee Structures: Investor and Man-
ager Payoffs
In this section, we summarize the payoffs and present visualizations (Figure 1.1-1.6) for each
of the shared-loss and first-loss fee structures that have been considered in the literature.
The manager has two ways to provide downside protection for the investor. First, a separate
escrow account can be established, from which the investor’s losses are reimbursed. Second,
the manager can invest their own money in the fund and insure the investor’s losses from
their own share. Let α be the constant of proportionality for the performance fees, which
are a fixed proportion of the net profits obtained by the fund. The typical value of α ranges
from 20% to 50%, depending on the fee structures that the hedge fund manager employs.2
In addition to the initial investment and the running fee for assets under management,
investors may also pay an upfront fee to the fund manager. The fair value for this upfront
fee is discussed later in this chapter.
Throughout the thesis, we assume that the value of the investor’s initial investment in
the hedge fund is 1. This assumption holds even when the current (i.e. time zero) value of
the hedge fund assets, typically denoted by x, is not equal to 1, and the initial investment
was made in the past. The value 1 will then still appear in the payoff functions of investors
and managers, as a threshold to determine whether the investor has made a profit or a loss
(and thus whether a performance fee is due, or the insurance component of a novel hedge
fund fee structure is activated). This assumption is made without loss of generality. If
the initial investment in the fund was instead y 6= 1, then rather than receiving the payoff




). This point is discussed in detail in Appendix A.
1.2.1 Compensation from an Escrow Account
In this case, the hedge fund manager sets up an escrow account,3 which is used to cover
the investor’s losses. Here, we use c, 0 < c < 1, a percentage of the initial investment, to
2Slight variations on the assumptions presented in this section are employed in Chapters 4 and 5,
when it is more convenient for performing a mathematical analysis of the relevant financial arrangements.
Details are presented therein.
3An escrow account is an account operated by a highly credible third party, such as a major bank, on
behalf of the transacting parties. The hedge fund manager deposits the amount c at the initial time in
the escrow account. The assets in the account would typically be invested in very safe securities, such as
government bonds. Any interest/return on this deposit is payable to the manager, so the amount available
as insurance to cover the investor’s losses remains constant at c. The key points are that the escrow
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denote the escrow amount (c = 0.1 would be a typical value in practice).
First-Loss
For the first-loss case, the hedge fund manager will compensate all of the investor’s losses
until the escrow amount is exhausted. The payoff function to the investor is
g(x) =

α + (1− α)x, x ≥ 1,
1, (1− c) < x < 1,
c+ x, x ≤ 1− c.
(1.1)
The upper piece of the payoff (when x ≥ 1) gives the investor’s payoff as the value to which
the investment has grown (x), less the payment of the performance fee to the manager of
α times the profit (α · (x− 1)), i.e. x− α(x− 1) = α + (1− α)x. The middle component
of the payoff reflects the fact that when the value of the fund declines, but by an amount
less than the total value of losses insured (c), the investor simply ends up with the value of
the initial investment. The lower piece shows that when the fund value declines by more
than c, the investor keeps the residual fund value x, and receives the insurance payment c.
account is segregated from the other assets of the fund (the hedge fund manager does not have access to
it), and its value does not decline when the hedge fund loses money.
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Escrow First−Loss Fee Structure
Investor's Initial Investment
Figure 1.1: Investor’s Payoffs: Escrow First-Loss Fee Structure with parameters c = 0.1
and α = 0.5.
Shared-Loss
For the shared-loss case, the manager covers a proportion θ of the investor’s losses from an
escrow account. If c ≥ θ, which indicates the escrow account cannot be exhausted, then
the payoff to the investor is
g(x) =
{
α + (1− α)x, x ≥ 1,
θ + (1− θ)x, x < 1. (1.2)
The upper piece of the payoff reflects the payment of the performance fee to the fund
manager, as described above. In the lower piece, where the fund has lost money, the
investor receives the remainder of the fund’s assets (x), plus the fraction θ of the amount
lost (i.e. θ · (1− x)), for a total payoff of x+ θ(1− x) = θ + (1− θ)x.
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Escrow Shared−Loss Fee Structure
Investor's Initial Investment
Figure 1.2: Investor’s Payoffs: Escrow Shared-Loss Fee Structure (c ≥ θ) with parameters
θ = 0.8 and α = 0.5.
If c < θ, then the payoff to the investor is
g(x) =

α + (1− α)x, x ≥ 1,
θ + (1− θ)x, (1− c
θ
) < x < 1,




The difference between this payment and the previous one is that here losses are only
compensated until the amount c in the escrow account is exhausted, which occurs when
the insurance payment θ · (1− x) equals c, i.e. when x = 1− c
θ
(or, equivalently, when the
loss equals c
θ
). When losses exceed c
θ
, the investor receives the residual assets x together
with the insurance payment of c.
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Escrow Shared−Loss Fee Structure
Investor's Initial Investment
Figure 1.3: Investor’s Payoffs: Escrow Shared-Loss Fee Structure (c < θ) with parameters
c = 0.1, θ = 0.8 and α = 0.5.
1.2.2 Compensation from the Manager’s Own Investment
In this arrangement, the manager invests their own capital into the fund. Let ω ∈ (0, 1) be
the proportion of the investor’s initial investment contributed by the manager. The total
initial investment is thus (1 + ω). Again, when the portfolio suffers a loss, the manager
can use their own share to compensate the investor’s loss until the investor is made whole,
or the manager’s capital is exhausted.
First-Loss
In first-loss structures, the manager’s share of the fund is used to completely cover the





α + (1− α)x, x ≥ 1,
1, 1
1+ω
< x < 1,




As always, the upper piece reflects the payment of the performance fee to the fund manager.
In the event of a loss, if the investor’s initial investment of 1 has declined to x < 1, then
the fund manager’s initial investment of ω has declined to ωx, and this amount is available
to make the insurance payment to the investor. If ωx > (1−x) (or, equivalently, x > 1
1+ω
),
then the manager’s remaining funds are sufficient to cover the investor’s losses, and the
investor is made whole with payoff 1. Otherwise, the investor receives the residual amounts
from both their own investment (x) and the manager’s allocated investment (ωx), i.e.
(1 + ω)x.

























Non−Escrow First−Loss Fee Structure
Investor's Initial Investment
Figure 1.4: Investor’s Payoffs: Non-Escrow First-Loss Fee Structure with parameters ω =
0.1 and α = 0.5.
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Shared-Loss
Finally, in the shared-loss case the manager has invested the amount ω in the fund and




α + (1− α)x, x ≥ 1,
θ + (1− θ)x, θ
ω+θ
< x < 1,




The upper piece gives the investor’s residual share after the performance fee has been paid
to the fund manager. As with the first-loss structure, when a loss occurs and the investor’s
funds have declined to the amount x < 1, then the manager’s funds have decreased to ωx.
This amount is used to cover the fraction θ < 1 of the investor’s losses (1−x). The amount
to be paid to the investor is thus θ(1 − x). However, this payment is only possible when
ωx ≥ θ(1 − x) (or, upon rearrangement, when x ≥ θ
ω+θ
). If this holds, then the investor
receives the residual amount of their investment x plus the insurance payment θ(1−x), for
a total payoff of x+ θ(1− x) = θ + (1− θ)x. Otherwise, the investor receives the residual
amounts from both their own investment (x) and the manager’s allocated investment (ωx),
for a total of (1 + ω)x.
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Non−Escrow Shared−Loss Fee Structure
Investor's Initial Investment
Figure 1.5: Investor’s Payoffs: Non-Escrow Shared-Loss Fee Structure with parameters
ω = 0.1, θ = 0.8 and α = 0.5.
1.2.3 General Formulation
As noted in Chen et al. (2020), under both the first-loss and shared-loss fee structures, the
payoff function g(x) can be written in the following form:
g(x) =

A+Bx, 0 ≤ x ≤ κ
q + (1− q)x, κ ≤ x ≤ 1,
p+ (1− p)x, 1 ≤ x,
(1.6)
where B ≥ 1 ≥ q ≥ A ≥ 0, p ∈ (0, 1) and κ = (B − (1− q))−1(q −A). The following table
provides the detailed parameterization for each fee structure mentioned above.
11
Payoff A B q p κ
Escrow, First-Loss c 1 1 α 1− c
Escrow, Shared-Loss, c ≥ θ θ 1 θ α 0
Escrow, Shared-Loss, c < θ c 1 θ α 1− c
θ
Non-Escrow, First-Loss 0 1 + ω 1 α (1 + ω)−1
Non-Escrow, Shared-Loss 0 1 + ω θ α θ(ω + θ)−1
Table 1.1: Parameterization of the general payoff function (1.6) for all fee structures intro-
duced in Section 1.2.1 and Section 1.2.2.
It is important for the intuitive understanding of the fee arrangements that the above
payoff function (1.6) can be interpreted in terms of portfolios of options. In particular, we
may regard the position of the investor in the hedge fund as equivalent to the following:
 Owning the assets of the underlying hedge fund (payoff to the investor: x).
 Having given p call options on the hedge fund assets with strike price 1 to the hedge
fund manager. These options constitute the performance fee (payoff to the investor:
−p(x− 1)+).
 Having received from the hedge fund manager q put options on the hedge fund assets
with strike price 1. These options constitute the insurance inherent in the shared/first
loss fee structures (payoff to the investor q(1− x)+).
 Having given to the hedge fund manager F = B−(1−q) put options with strike price
κ. These options represent the limit on the insurance component of the shared/first
loss fee structures (payoff to the investor −F (κ− x)+).
The total payoff to the hedge fund investor is then:
x− p(x− 1)+ + q(1− x)+ − (B − (1− q))(κ− x)+ = g(x). (1.7)
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1.3 Summary of the Thesis and its Contributions to
Research
1.3.1 Early Withdrawal from Hedge Fund Investments and Op-
timal Stopping Problems
A critical aspect of the management of investments in hedge funds with first-loss fee struc-
tures is the ability of the investor to time the withdrawal of their money. Barr (2011)
states that “[t]he downside for managers is that, if they suffer a big monthly loss, they
lose their own capital quickly. And first-loss capital providers can pull their money fast to
protect their investment”. Weiss (2018) notes that billionaire hedge fund manager John
Paulson resorted to employing first-loss fee structures in order to attract investors; again,
the possibility of early withdrawal of investors’ funds was crucial: “[w]hile Prelude and its
two peers supply most of the capital in first-loss strategies, they almost never lose any of
it. That’s because they can shut down an account once most of the hedge fund manager’s
capital is gone.”
In Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, we analyze the investor’s problem of determining
the optimal time to withdraw from an investment in a hedge fund with a first-loss fee
structure.4 In particular, we assume that the investor’s share of the hedge fund assets Xt,
under the risk-neutral measure Q, satisfies the dynamics:
dXxt = (r − δ)Xxt dt+ σXxt dWt, Xx0 = x, t ≥ 0, (1.8)




where r is the risk-free rate, δ > 0 is the fee for assets under management (paid continu-
ously), σ > 0 is the volatility and Wt is a standard Brownian motion on the probability
space (Ω,F ,Q) with filtration {Ft}∞t=0, the standard augmentation of the filtration gener-
ated by W , satisfying the usual conditions. It is worth mentioning that Xx0 denotes the
position of investor’s share in the hedge fund at current time. The initial investment (which
may have taken place before time 0) is assumed to be 1 for Chapters 2 and 3, and this is
without loss of generality, as discussed above. From the investor’s perspective, we assume
the optimal withdrawal time is determined by maximizing the expected discounted payoff
4Parts of Chapters 2 and 3 are contained in the paper Meng and Saunders (2019), which has been
submitted for publication.
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in this risk-neutral world. Then the value function for the infinite horizon case is
V (x) = sup
τ∈T
E[e−rτg(Xxτ )], (1.9)
where T is the set of all stopping times. On the other hand, if the investor has a finite
investment horizon T , then the value function at the current time is
v(x, T ) = sup
τ∈T[0,T ]
E[e−rτg(Xxτ )], (1.10)
where τ ∈ T[0,T ] is the set of all stopping times such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ T , and g(x) is the
investor’s payoff function (1.6), with different parametrization corresponding to different
fee structures. As we will see in Chapters 2 and 3, for interesting values of the fee structure
parameters (q > p), V (1) > v(1, T ) > 1. The fair value for an upfront payment (in addition
to the investment amount) by the hedge fund investor to the fund manager is V (1) − 1
in the infinite horizon case, and v(1, T ) − 1 when T is the time to maturity at contract
initiation, in the finite horizon case.
The value functions with an arbitrary initial investment amount y 6= 1 can be obtained
using (1.9) and (1.10), in particular as V (x; y) = y · V (x
y
), and v(x, T ; y) = y · v(x
y
, T ; y).
Detailed derivations can be found in Appendix A.
The use of risk-neutral valuation is typically justified in the case of American options
based on arbitrage arguments (see, for example Detemple (2006)). In the case of hedge
fund investments, some of the assumptions for these arguments, such as the ability to
trade in the underlying (and observe its price) continuously do not hold as closely. The
motivation for employing risk-neutral valuation is threefold. First of all, there is a clear
gain in mathematical convenience and tractability (essentially, working with linear utility
functions rather than, e.g. S-shaped utility functions as in He and Kou (2018)). Secondly,
equations (1.9) and (1.10) can be interpreted as providing a “fair” price for the hedge fund
investment, which gives investors a sense of whether the hedge fund manager is taking
advantage of them with the new fee structures or not. Finally, in practice, it is difficult to
find a utility function which can describe (or prescribe) different investors’ behaviour, and
subsequently to determine appropriate parameters for that function. This is significant,
as Cremers et al. (2005) show that different specifications of investors’ preferences (power
utility, bilinear utility and S-shaped utility functions) imply significant divergence in hedge
fund investment allocations.
There is a large literature on optimal stopping problems for one-dimensional diffusion
processes and their applications in finance, dating back to the seminal work of McKean
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(1965). Standard references include the books Detemple (2006), Pham (2009), Peskir
and Shiryaev (2006). In the literature, a particularly prominent role is played by the re-
lationship between optimal stopping problems and variational inequalities/free-boundary
problems for partial differential operators. This approach to the analysis of optimal stop-
ping problems is also foremost in our work. An optimal stopping problem with a piecewise
linear payoff similar to g arises in the analysis of the capped American call option studied
in Broadie and Detemple (1995). An optimal stopping game involving piecewise linear
payoffs is analyzed in Gapeev (2005). The paper closest to the current work is Chen
et al. (2020). In that paper, rather than considering the fund manager’s problem of opti-
mally structuring the investments of the hedge fund assets given a specified fee structure,
the authors studied the investor’s (optimal stopping) problem of when to withdraw the
investment from the fund under the assumption that the fund assets follow a geometric
Brownian motion. In that paper, no penalty for withdrawal, or fee for assets under manage-
ment was considered. The infinite horizon optimal stopping problem was solved explicitly,
and various properties of the finite horizon problem, including the existence and convexity
properties of optimal stopping boundaries were studied. However, the authors mention
that they do not investigate other aspects of fee agreements such as the management fee
or the penalty for early redemption.
The Case of an Infinite Investment Horizon
The optimal withdrawal time problem for an investor in a hedge fund with a shared-loss
fee structure with an infinite horizon is studied in Chapter 2. We follow the established
approach of characterizing the value function V of (1.9) as the unique viscosity solution of
the variational inequality:
min (V − g, rV − LV ) = 0 (1.11)
satisfying appropriate boundary conditions. Here L is the generator of the diffusion (1.8),
a differential operator that acts on smooth functions f as:








Based on financial considerations, and the related work of Chen et al. (2020), we are
able to conjecture and then prove properties about the shape of the continuation and
stopping regions. In particular, the continuation region is a bounded interval, with the
lower stopping boundary being strictly below the initial investment level (normalized to
be 1), and the upper boundary strictly above it. The traditional “smooth fit” condition
holds at the upper boundary point, but may fail at the lower boundary point. Based on
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these results, we are subsequently able to derive the value function for the optimal stopping
problem explicitly. Computation of the value function requires only the solution of a simple
system of nonlinear equations in order to determine the boundaries of the stopping region.5
Finally, we present examples of the solution of the optimal stopping problem with different
values for the model parameters, analyze the sensitivity of the value function to the model
parameters, and discuss the financial interpretation of our results.
The Case of a Finite Investment Horizon
In the third chapter, we analyze the optimal stopping problem (1.10), with finite invest-
ment horizon. This problem is significantly more difficult mathematically than the infinite
horizon problem studied in Chapter 2, and no explicit solution is available. However, we
are able to derive several mathematical properties of its solution. As in Chapter 2, we
apply the established approach of characterizing the value function as the unique viscosity
solution of a variational inequality:
min
(




together with appropriate initial and boundary conditions. Again, we are able to show
that there are two (time-dependent) stopping boundaries, with the upper boundary being
increasing and the lower boundary decreasing, with the limits as T →∞ being the bound-
aries from the infinite horizon problem in each case. We then proceed to apply techniques
from Detemple (2006) and Peskir (2005) to derive a pair of coupled integral equations for
the two stopping boundaries in the case when the smooth fit condition applies. A similar
set of integral equations has also been derived by Ciurlia and Roko (2005) in the case of the
pricing of American installment options. Finally, following the probabilistic strategy initi-
ated by Lamberton (1995), we derive the asymptotic behaviour of the stopping boundaries
in small time.
1.3.2 Hybrid Fee Structures: The Myth of Fee Diversification
In this section, we describe the contributions of Chapter 4 of this thesis.6 As noted above,
in recent years, innovative fee structures have emerged aiming at better alignment between
5The solution of the nonlinear system also determines whether the smooth fit condition holds at the
lower boundary of the continuation region.
6The research in Chapter 4 has been published in Meng et al. (2019).
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investors’ interests and the hedge fund’s business objectives. These range from first-loss
agreements, in which the hedge fund manager provides complete insurance for losses (up
to some limit), to shared-loss structures, in which losses are borne by both the hedge
fund manager and the investor. In all cases, the hedge fund manager is compensated for
providing downside protection in terms of a higher performance fee (see Banzaca (2012) for
a description). In analogy with the concept of diversification from portfolio theory, some
investors and managers began to express the hypothesis7 that the optimal fee structure
from the fund investor’s point of view should be a shared-loss structure, i.e. a combination
of the extremes.8
In Chapter 4, we test the hypothesis of fee diversification, and find that it largely does
not hold up to careful scrutiny. In particular, we study the optimization problem of an
investor who may choose any combination of the first loss and classical fee structures, and
seeks to maximize either the Sharpe ratio or the Sortino ratio of their final payoff, evaluated
using real-world probabilities.9 We demonstrate that for the vast majority of fund mean
returns and volatilities, there is no fee diversification effect: either the first-loss structure
or the classical structure is optimal for the investor. In the case of the Sortino ratio, this is
investigated numerically, while for the Sharpe ratio, we also characterize mathematically
the combinations of model parameters for which fee diversification is possible, and present
a financial argument for why one should expect this region to be small. Furthermore, in
the regions of the parameter space where fee diversification prevails we demonstrate that
its impact is not large.
1.3.3 A New Type of Compensation Arrangement: Hedge Funds
with Negative Fees
Chapter 5 discusses valuation and risk measurement for investors in a hedge fund with a
novel fee structure, referred to as a negative fee arrangement. Negative fee structures pro-
vide hedge fund investors with a fixed promised return; as compensation for this promised
payment, the hedge fund manager keeps the profits from the investments of the fund’s as-
sets. The return profile of an investment in a hedge fund with negative fees then resembles
that of an investment in a fixed-income instrument, or an asset-backed security where the
underlying pool of assets is the hedge fund’s investments. In Chapter 5, we present an
7Luis Seco, personal communication, based on experiences at several industry conferences.
8The payouts with different fee structures on the same fund are comonotonic, but not perfectly corre-
lated.
9We continue to employ the assumption of normally distributed log-returns that was used in earlier
chapters.
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analysis of the value and risks of investments in such products. We begin by employing
risk-neutral valuation, using both Black-Scholes and regime-switching models. The use
of option pricing models allows one to calculate a “fair” fee rate, for which the value of
the investor’s payoff exactly equals their initial investment. We then proceed to analyze
the risks inherent in investments in hedge funds with negative fee structures. Given the
resemblance of these investments to asset-backed securities, we in particular study prob-
ability of default and loss given default under the real-world measure for both geometric
Brownian motion and regime-switching models. The impact of the model parameters on
the resulting risks of the investment is studied in detail through numerical examples.
The research presented in Chapter 5 has been published in Bhaduri et al. (2018). At
the time when the research was undertaken and published, hedge fund investments with
negative fee structures were a hypothetical product that we were interested in analyzing
as an extension of the shared-loss concept. Since the publication of this research, products
with related fee structures have appeared in the European market (Sigma Analysis and
Management Ltd., 2020).
1.3.4 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
The sixth chapter concludes the thesis, and presents several possible extensions of the




Shared-Loss Fee Structures: The
Infinite Horizon Case
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we analyze the problem of determining the optimal withdrawal time from
an investment in a hedge fund with a shared-loss fee structure when there is no investment
horizon (i.e. T = ∞). The techniques employed are similar to those used for the infinite
horizon American put (e.g. Pham (2009)). The value function of the optimal stopping
problem is characterized as the unique solution of a variational inequality involving the
generator of the diffusion process. A conjecture for the shape of the continuation region is
then made based on financial intuition, and it is proved that the continuation region does
indeed have this shape. The variational inequality can then be solved using ODE methods
and the solution of a pair of nonlinear equations.
We find that the continuation region is an interval, and there are two stopping boundaries,
one corresponding to large losses, and the other to large gains. The situation is similar
to that which arises with American continuous installment options (see, e.g. Ciurlia and
Roko (2005), Kimura (2009)). There is an obvious incentive to withdraw when there are
substantial losses, as the insurance against investor losses has basically been exhausted
(this is analogous to exercising the option when it is in the money). However, when gains
are very large, the cost of the performance fee, which may be interpreted as an option
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that the fund investor has provided to the fund manager, becomes too large, and the
probability of the investor’s downside protection taking effect becomes miniscule. At this
point, the investor would be better off under another fee structure (this is analogous to the
situation when a continuous installment option is exercised/cancelled because the ongoing
installment fees are too expensive when the option is very deep out of the money, and
unlikely to expire with a positive payoff).
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The second section presents the
formulation of the problem of determining the best time to withdraw from the hedge
fund investment as an optimal stopping problem, and the characterization of the value
function as the unique solution of a variational inequality. The third section discusses
basic properties of the stopping and continuation regions. The fourth section gives a
detailed derivation of the value function, and the fifth section presents numerical results.
2.2 Problem Formulation and Characterization of
the Value Function
Recall from Chapter One that we assume that the investor’s share of the hedge fund assets
satisfies the dynamics
dXxt = (r − δ)Xxt dt+ σXxt dWt, Xx0 = x, t ≥ 0, (2.1)




where r ≥ 0 is the risk-free rate, δ > 0 is the fee for assets under management (paid
continuously), σ > 0 is the volatility and Wt is a standard Brownian motion on the prob-
ability space (Ω,F ,Q) with filtration {Ft}∞t=0, the standard augmentation of the filtration
generated by W , satisfying the usual conditions.1 The value function for the investor’s
problem of determining the optimal time to withdraw from the hedge fund in the infinite
1Assuming r and σ to be constant over an infinite horizon, or even a long-dated finite horizon is a
simplification that yields a tractable mathematical model, but obviously cannot but justified based on
empirical evidence. Extension of the results of this Chapter to more realistic mathematical models is a
potential direction for future research. We do note, however, that numerical experiments show that the
boundaries for the finite horizon model with constant parameters do converge rather quickly to the infinite
horizon boundaries as time to maturity grows (see Chapter 6).
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horizon case is
V (x) = sup
τ∈T
E[e−rτg(Xxτ )], (2.2)
where T is the set of all stopping times.
It is well-known that under quite general assumptions, the value function V of the
infinite horizon problem (2.2) is a viscosity solution of the following variational inequality:
min
(
rV − LV, V − g
)
= 0, (2.3)
where L is the infinitesimal generator of the process X. For convenience, we recall here
the definition of a viscosity solution in this context (see, e.g. Reikvam (1998), Pham
(2009, Definition 4.2.1, Page 63) or Touzi (2013, Definition 6.3, Page 68)). Let L be the
infinitesimal generator of the process X, which operates on smooth functions W as








Definition 2.2.1. Let W ∈ C([0,∞),R). Then,
1. W is a viscosity super-solution of (2.3) if
min
(
rW (x0)− Lϕ(x0),W (x0)− g(x0)
)
≥ 0 (2.4)
for all smooth functions ϕ and all x0 ∈ (0,∞) such that W − ϕ attains a local mini-
mum at x0.
2. W is a viscosity sub-solution of (2.3) if
min
(
rW (x0)− Lψ(x0),W (x0)− g(x0)
)
≤ 0 (2.5)
for all smooth functions ψ and all x0 ∈ (0,∞) such that W − ψ attains a local max-
imum at x0.
W is called a viscosity solution of (2.3) if it is both a viscosity super-solution and a viscosity
sub-solution.
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The results in the following proposition follow from standard techniques, and indeed
most of them are special cases of results that can be found in the literature (e.g. mono-
tonicity is immediate, while Lipschitz continuity follows from Pham (2009), Lemma 5.2.1,
page 96). They are collected here for completeness and convenience, with no claim to
originality intended.
Proposition 2.2.1. Consider the payoff function g(x) in (1.6) and the value function
V (x) in (2.2). The following properties hold:
a. For x ∈ [0,∞), V (x) is non-decreasing, Lipschitz continuous, and limx→∞ V (x)g(x) = 1.
b. If p ≥ q, then V (x) = g(x).
Proof. a. For x ≥ 0 and τ ∈ T , define
J(x, τ) = E[e−rτg(Xxτ )].
Then, for y ≥ x,
J(y, τ)− J(x, τ) = E[e−rτ
(
g(Xyτ )− g(Xxτ )
)
] ≥ 0,
because g(x) is an increasing function and Xyτ −Xxτ = (y−x) exp{(r−δ− 12σ
2)τ+σWτ} ≥ 0
for all stopping times τ ∈ T . Thus V (y) = supτ∈T E[e−rτg(Xyτ )] ≥ supτ∈T E[e−rτg(Xxτ )] =
V (x). Hence, V (x) is an increasing function. For Lipschitz continuity, we use that for
r ≥ 0, y ≥ x, e−rt(Xyt −Xxt ) = (y − x)e−δt exp(−σ
2
2
t+Wt) is a positive, continuous super-
martingale so that by the Optional Stopping Theorem (Revuz and Yor (1994) Theorem
3.3, pages 66-67) and the Lipschitz continuity of g:







E[e−rτ |g(Xyτ )− g(Xxτ )|]
≤M sup
τ∈T
E[e−rτ |Xyτ −Xxτ |] ≤M |x− y| (2.6)
where M is the Lipschitz constant of g. Taking τ = 0 ∈ T implies V (x) ≥ g(x), so
lim infx→∞ V (x)/g(x) ≥ 1. Also, g(x) ≤ A + Bx and the fact that e−rτXxτ is a posi-
tive supermartingale imply, by the Optional Stopping Theorem, E[e−rτg(Xxτ )] ≤ E[A +
Be−rτXxτ ] ≤ A + Bx for any stopping time τ ∈ T , which implies V (x) ≤ A + Bx. Next,
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let θx = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt = 1}. Then, by the Dynamic Programming Principle (Pham, 2009,
Page 97), for x > 1,
V (x) = sup
τ∈T
E[e−rτg(Xxτ )1τ<θx + e−rθxV (Xxθx)1τ≥θx ]
≤ sup
τ∈T
E[e−rτ (p+ (1− p)Xxτ ) + V (1)e−rθx ]
≤ p+ (1− p)x+ V (1)E[e−rθx ]
≤ g(x) + (A+B). (2.7)
From (2.7), it is easy to verify that lim supx→∞ V (x)/g(x) ≤ 1. Thus, limx→∞ V (x)/g(x) =
1.
b. In this case, g is concave, and so Jensen’s inequality implies that for t > s:
E[g(Xt)e−rt|Fs] ≤ e−rtg(E[Xt|Fs]) ≤ e−rtg(Xs) ≤ e−rsg(Xs) (2.8)
where the expectations all exist because of the bound g(x) ≤ A + Bx. The result then
follows from the Optional Stopping Theorem. 
Mathematically, part b of the above result follows from the concavity of g. Financially,
the intuition is that in such circumstances the size of the performance fee paid to the
hedge fund manager is too large to justify, and in particular is always worth more than the
value of the insurance component of the fee structure; it is better for investors to withdraw
immediately from the ill-posed contract. Consequently, for the rest of this chapter, we only
consider the case when q > p.
Theorem 2.2.1. The value function V (x) in (2.2) is the unique viscosity solution of
min
(
rV − LV, V − g
)
= 0 (2.9)
satisfying V (0) = A and V ∼ g as x→∞.
Proof. From part (a) of Proposition 2.2.1, we can verify that V (x) satisfies a linear growth
condition. Then, by Pham (2009, Theorem 5.2.1, Page 97-99), V (x) is the unique viscosity
solution of (2.9). 
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By Theorem 2.2.1, we know that solving (2.2) is equivalent to finding a function sat-
isfying (2.9). Therefore, the next two sections are devoted to finding a more explicit form
for V (x). Moreover, given Proposition 2.2.1, we only consider the case when q > p.
2.3 Properties of the Stopping and Continuation Re-
gions
Recalling that V (x) ≥ g(x), we can divide the interval [0,∞) into two disjoint sets,
S = {x|V (x) = g(x)}, C = {x|V (x) > g(x)},
where S is the stopping region and C is the continuation region. By Theorem 2.2.1, and
V (x) > g(x) in C, we can easily deduce that V (x) satisfies the Cauchy-Euler equation
LW − rW = 0, (2.10)
in C (Pham (2009, Lemma 5.2.2, Page 100)). Consider this equation with initial conditions
W (x0) = z0 and W
′(x0) = z1. Let β =
2r
σ2
> 0 and γ = 2δ
σ2
> 0. The general solution of
(2.10) is of the form





−(β − γ − 1) +
√
(β − γ − 1)2 + 4β
2
, z2 =
−(β − γ − 1)−
√
(β − γ − 1)2 + 4β
2
,
and C1, C2 are constants depending on the initial conditions. Next, note that since β > 0
and γ > 0, the following inequalities must hold:
(β − γ − 1)2 + 4β > (β − γ − 1)2 + 4β − 4γ
⇒ (β − γ − 1)2 + 4β > (β − γ − 1)2 + 4(β − γ − 1) + 4
⇒ (β − γ − 1)2 + 4β > [(β − γ − 1) + 2]2. (2.12)
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If β − γ − 1 + 2 ≥ 0, then (2.12) implies√
(β − γ − 1)2 + 4β > (β − γ − 1) + 2
⇒ −(β − γ − 1) +
√
(β − γ − 1)2 + 4β > 2
⇒ z1 =
−(β − γ − 1) +
√
(β − γ − 1)2 + 4β
2
> 1.
On the other hand, if β − γ − 1 + 2 < 0, then
− (β − γ − 1) > 2
⇒ −(β − γ − 1) +
√
(β − γ − 1)2 + 4β > 2
⇒ z1 =
−(β − γ − 1) +
√
(β − γ − 1)2 + 4β
2
> 1.
So, we have proved that z1 > 1. Moreover, (β − γ − 1)2 + 4β > (β − γ − 1)2 > 0 implies
−(β − γ − 1) −
√
(β − γ − 1)2 + 4β < 0 so that z2 < 0. Finally, the initial conditions
W (x0) = z0 and W












Remark 2.3.1. From (2.13), we can easily find,
W ′′(x) = C1z1(z1 − 1)xz1−2 + C2z2(z2 − 1)xz2−2.
Since z1 > 1, z2 < 0, we can observe if either C1 > 0, C2 ≥ 0 or C1 ≥ 0, C2 > 0 holds, then
W (x) is strictly convex on (0,∞).
Before deriving the form of V (x) in the next section, we present and prove the following
properties of the stopping region and the continuation region.
Proposition 2.3.1. Suppose that q > p, then,
a. [0, κ] ⊆ S.
b. 1 ∈ C.
c. If a < 1 and a ∈ S, then [0, a] ⊆ S.
d. If b > 1 and b ∈ S, then [b,∞] ⊆ S.
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Proof. a. Taking τ = 0 ∈ T , we have g(x) ≤ V (x). That g(x) ≤ A + Bx and e−rtXxt
is a supermartingale give us V (x) ≤ A + Bx. Thus, for x ∈ [0, κ], we conclude
V (x) = A+Bx.




and ξ ∈ (1 − q, 1 − p). Clearly, ϕ(1) = 1, ϕ′(1) = ξ, and ϕ′′(1) =
nξ. So, ϕ(x) < g(x) for x close to 1. By the super-solution property, we know
rϕ(1)− Lϕ(1) ≥ 0, but
rϕ(1)− Lϕ(1) = r − (r − δ)ξ − 1
2
σ2nξ = r(1− ξ) + δξ − 1
2
σ2nξ < 0
for n large enough, which contradicts the super-solution property. So 1 ∈ C.
c. If a ≤ κ, [0, κ] ⊆ S implies [0, a] ⊆ S. So we only consider the case when κ < a < 1.
Suppose there exists an x̃ ∈ (κ, a] such that V (x̃) > g(x̃). Let h(x) = V (x) − g(x).
We have h(κ) = h(a) = 0 since κ and a are in the stopping region. Noting that
h(x̃) > 0, then we must have some point(s) x∗ ∈ (κ, a) at which h attains a strictly
positive local maximum. In other words, we have the following relations,
h(x∗) > 0, x∗ ∈ C, h′(x∗) = 0, and h′′(x∗) ≤ 0.
Now, it can be easily obtained that,
rh(x∗)− Lh(x∗) = rh(x∗)− σ
2(x∗)2
2
h′′(x∗)− (r − δ)xh′(x∗) ≥ 0. (2.14)
However, x∗ ∈ C implies that rV (x∗)− LV (x∗) = 0 and it is easy to see that:
rg(x)− Lg(x) =

rA+ δxB, x ∈ (0, κ),
rq + δx(1− q), x ∈ (κ, 1),
rp+ δx(1− p), x ∈ (1,∞),
so that rg − Lg > 0 for x ∈ (0, κ) ∪ (κ, 1) ∪ (1,∞). Therefore, we must have
rh(x∗)− Lh(x∗) = r(V (x∗)− g(x∗))− L(V (x∗)− g(x∗)) < 0, a contradiction.
d. Suppose x̃ = inf{x > b|x ∈ C} exists. Then V (x̃) = p+ (1− p)x̃ and V ′(x̃) = (1− p).
Again, V (x) = C1x
z1 + C2x
z2 in C. It is easy to verify that C1 > 0, C2 > 0 and
hence V (x) is strictly convex. Again, by the continuity and strict convexity of V (x),
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This contradicts the fact that limx→∞ V (x)/g(x) = 1 when x approaches infinity.

From Proposition 2.3.1, we can define the stopping boundaries as follows:
S1 := inf{x ∈ [κ, 1)|V (x) > g(x)}, S2 := sup{x > 1|V (x) > g(x)}.
Then, κ ≤ S1 < 1, S2 > 1, C = (S1, S2) and S = [0, S1] ∪ [S2,∞] with the possible special
case C = (S1,∞) and S = [0, S1] if S2 = ∞. In the following section, we will show that
under all choices of parameters, S2 < ∞, and present the analytic solution of V (x) when
q > p.
2.4 Derivation of the Value Function
For V (x) with no fee for assets under management (i.e. δ = 0), Chen et al. (2020) proved
that the continuation region starts either at S1, κ ≤ S1 < 1 with the smooth-fit condition
or at κ without the smooth-fit condition. These two cases are determined by the parameter
values. Following their result, we will seek criteria that distinguish these two cases.
Proposition 2.4.1. (Smooth-Fit Condition) If S1 = κ, then V
′(S1) ∈ [1 − q, B]. If
κ < S1 < 1, then V
′(S1) = g
′(S1). Moreover, if S2 <∞, V ′(S2) = g′(S2).
Proof. The proof mimics the technique from Pham (2009, Proposition 5.2.1). Since V (x) ≥
g(x) and V (S1) = g(S1), we have g
′(S1+) ≤ V ′(S1) ≤ g′(S1−) and V ′(S1−) ≤ g′(S1) ≤
V ′(S1+). Therefore, if S1 = κ, then V
′(S1) ∈ [1− q, B]. If κ < S1 < 1, we assume V ′(S1)
does not exist. Then, we must have V ′(S1+) > g
′(S1+) = g
′(S1−) = V ′(S1−). Now, taking
some a1 ∈ (V ′(S1−), V ′(S1+)), then we have V ′(S1+) − a1 > 0 and V ′(S1−) − a1 < 0.
Next, for ε > 0, we define the test function:





Differentiating V (x)− ϕε(x) for x 6= S1, we obtain




Then, from (2.16) it is easy to check
V ′(S1+)− ϕ′ε(S1+) > 0 and V ′(S1−)− ϕ′ε(S1−) < 0,
for x close to S1. Therefore, V (x) − ϕε(x) attains a local minimum at S1 and V (S1) −
ϕε(S1) = 0 . By the super-solution property, we must have




But, for ε sufficiently small, rV (S1) − (r − δ)a1S1 − σ
2S21
2ε
< 0, contradicting the above
inequality. Thus, V ′(S1) = g
′(S1).
Finally, to prove V ′(S2) = g
′(S2), we use exactly the same arguments as above to show
V ′(S2−) ≤ g′(S2) ≤ V ′(S2+) and assume V ′(S2) does not exist. Then, define the test
function




where a2 ∈ (V ′(S2−), V ′(S2+)) and ε > 0. Then, V (x) − ϕε(x) must attain a local
minimum at S2 and V (S2)− ϕε(S2) = 0. But, when ε is sufficiently small,




which contradicts the super-solution property. Thus, V ′(S2) = g
′(S2). 
Next, we introduce some notation. Let W (x;x0, v0), C1(x0, v0), and C2(x0, v0) denote
W (x) = C1x
z1 +C2x
z2 , the solution to (2.10) with initial values W (x0) = q+ (1− q)x0 and
W ′(x0) = v0.
Lemma 2.4.1. a. For x0 ∈ (0,∞), C1(x0, 1 − q) is decreasing in x0, C2(x0, 1 − q) is
increasing in x0 and W (x;x0, 1 − q) is a strictly convex function of x on (0,∞).
Thus, for 0 < x1 < x2, W (x;x1, 1− q) > W (x;x2, 1− q) for all x ≥ x2.
b. For (q+(1−q)κ)z2
κ
≤ v0 ≤ (q+(1−q)κ)z1κ , W (x;κ, v0) is a strictly convex function of x on
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(0,∞). In particular, W (x;κ, qz1+(1−q)κz1
κ
) = κ−(z1−1)(1−q+ q
κ
)xz1 > g(x). Moreover,
for x > κ, W (x;κ, v0) is increasing in v0.
The proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix B. Now, define
h(x) := W (x;κ, 1− q)− (p+ (1− p)x). (2.19)
Then,
h(x) = C1(κ, 1− q)xz1 + C2(κ, 1− q)xz2 − (p+ (1− p)x).
h′(x) = z1C1(κ, 1− q)xz1−1 + z2C2(κ, 1− q)xz2−1 − (1− p),
h′′(x) = W ′′(x;κ) > 0.
Note that h′(κ) = 1 − q − 1 + p = p − q < 0, limx→∞ h′(x) = ∞ and h′′(x) > 0 for all
x > 0. So, there must exist a unique x∗ > κ such that h
′(x∗) = 0. Now, if h(x∗) > 0, then
the convexity of h(x) implies that W (x;κ, 1− q) never touches the line p+ (1− p)x from
above for x > κ. Since W (x;κ, 1 − q) is always greater than its tangent line q + (1 − q)x
for x > κ as well, W (x, κ, 1 − q) never touches g(x) for x > κ. Consequently, W (x;κ, v0)
never touches g(x) for x > κ and v0 > 1− q by Lemma 2.4.1 Part (b). However, we know
that V (x) is continuous and the smooth fit condition should hold at S2. Hence, we are
seeking solutions with initial value S1 ∈ [κ, 1) such that{
W (S2;S1, 1− q) = p+ (1− p)S2,
W ′(S2;S1, 1− q) = 1− p.
(2.20)
On the other hand, when h(x∗) < 0, it is easy to check that W (x∗;x0, 1−q)−(p+(1−p)x) <
h(x∗) < 0 for κ < x0 < 1. Thus, by the convexity of W (x;x0, 1−q), there does not exist an
S2 > 1 such that the smooth-fit condition holds at S2. Therefore, we shall seek solutions
on v0 ∈ [1− q,∞) such that{
W (S2;κ, v0) = p+ (1− p)S2,
W ′(S2;κ, v0) = 1− p.
(2.21)
The following proposition shows that there indeed exists a unique solution to (2.20) and
(2.21).
Proposition 2.4.2. Suppose p < q. Consider the function h(x) in equation (2.19) and let
x∗ > κ be the unique root such that h
′(x∗) = 0.
a. If h(x∗) ≥ 0, then there exists a unique solution (S1, S2) ∈ [κ, 1) × (1,∞) to the
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following system of equations
C1(S1, 1− q)Sz12 + C2(S1, 1− q)Sz22 = p+ (1− p)S2, (2.22)
z1C1(S1, 1− q)Sz1−12 + z2C2(S1, 1− q)Sz2−12 = 1− p. (2.23)




2 + C2(κ, v0)S
z2
2 = p+ (1− p)S2, (2.24)
z1C1(κ, v0)S
z1−1
2 + z2C2(κ, v0)S
z2−1
2 = 1− p. (2.25)
Proof. a. (1) Existence. Let
S1 = inf{0 < s < 1|W (x; s, 1− q) = g(x) for some x > 1}.
For S1 ≤ s < 1, define x(s) = inf{x > 1|W (x; s, 1 − q) = g(x)}. Note that by Lemma
2.4.1, if z2 < z1, W (x; z2, 1− q) > W (x; z1, 1− q) for x ≤ x(z1). Therefore, x(z2) > x(z1).
Let sn ↓ S1. Then, x(sn) ↑ x(S1) = S2, provided that S2 is finite. Now, let
f1(x; s) = W (x; s, 1− q)− g(x),




Suppose f ′1((x(sn); sn) > 0. Since f1(x(sn); sn) = 0, f1(x(sn) − ε; sn) < 0 for ε small
enough. Note that f ′1(
′(x; s) = W ′′(x; s, 1 − q) > 0 and f1(1; sn) > 0 implies that there
exists x ∈ (1, x(sn)) such that f1(x; sn) = 0, which contradicts the definition of x(sn).
Hence f ′1(x(sn); sn) ≤ 0, so f ′1(S2;S1) ≤ 0. Next, suppose f ′1(S2;S1) < 0, then for ε small
enough, we have f1(S2 + ε;S1) < 0. By continuity of f1(x; s), there exists some δ > 0 such
that f1(S2 +ε;S1−δ) < 0, which contradicts the definition of S1. Therefore, f ′1(S2;S1) = 0
and (S1, S2) is a solution of the following equations,{
C1(S1, 1− q)Sz12 + C2(S1, 1− q)Sz22 = p+ (1− p)S2,
z1C1(S1, 1− q)Sz1−12 + z2C2(S1, 1− q)Sz2−12 = 1− p.
(2.26)
Also, note that limx→∞ f
′
1(x;S1) = ∞ and f
′′
1 (x;S1) > 0. Thus, there exists a C large
enough such that f ′1(C;S1) > 0, so S2 is bounded by C.




1 6= S1 to (2.22) and
(2.23). First, we assume S∗1 < S1. Then by Lemma 2.4.1 Part (a), W (x;S
∗
1 , 1 − q) >
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W (x;S1, 1− q) ≥ g(x) > p+ (1− p)x for x ≥ S1. The convexity of W (x;S∗1 , 1− q) implies
W (x;S∗1 , 1 − q) ≥ q + (1 − q)x > p + (1 − p)x for S∗1 ≤ x < S1. Therefore, no such
S∗2 ∈ [S∗1 ,∞) could satisfy (2.22). Also, from the convexity of W (x;S∗1 , 1 − q), we know
W ′(x;S∗1 , 1−q) < 1−q < 1−p for 0 < x < S∗1 . Therefore, no such S∗2 ∈ [0, S∗1) could satisfy
(2.23). Thus, S∗1 > S1. However, we know p+(1−p)S2 = W (S2;S1, 1−q) > W (S2;S∗1 , 1−q).
The strict convexity of W (x, S∗1 , 1− q) implies that there must exist 0 < a1 < a2 such that
W (a1;S
∗
1 ; 1 − q) = p + (1 − p)a1 and W (a2;S∗1 ; 1 − q) = p + (1 − p)a2. The Mean Value
Theorem implies there must exist a point c ∈ (a1, a2) satisfying W ′(c;S∗1 , 1 − q) = 1 − p.
Again, the strict convexity of W (x;S∗1 ; 1 − q) implies that W ′(a1;S∗1 ; 1 − q) < 1 − p and
W ′(a2;S
∗
1 ; 1−q) > 1−p. Thus, no such S∗2 exists when S∗1 > S1 as well. So, S∗1 = S1. Thus,
we have f1(S
∗




2 ;S1) = 0. Since f1(x;S1) is a strictly convex function of
x on [1,∞), S∗2 is the unique point on [1,∞) satisfying f1(S∗2 ;S1) = 0 and f ′1(S∗2 ;S1) = 0.
But, we also have shown f1(S2;S1) = 0 and f
′
1(S2;S1) = 0 with S2 > 1 above. Therefore,
S∗2 = S2.
b. (1) Existence. Let
X :=
{
0 < v <
qz1 + (1− q)κz1
κ
|W (x;κ, v) = g(x) for some x > 1
}
, v0 := supX .
Note that h(x∗) < 0 implies 1 − q ∈ X , so X is non-empty. For 0 ≤ v < v0, define
x(v) = inf{x > 1|W (x;κ, v) = g(x)}. Note that for v1 < v2, W (x;κ, v2) > W (x;κ, v1) for
x ≤ x(v1). Therefore, x(v2) > x(v1). Let vn ↑ v0. Then, x(vn) ↑ x(v0) ≡ S2, provided that
S2 is finite. Define
f2(x; v) = W (x;κ, v)− g(x),




Suppose f ′2(x(vn); vn) > 0. Since f2(x(vn); vn) = 0, f2(x(vn) − ε; vn) < 0 for ε small
enough. Note that f ′′2 (x; v) = W
′′(x;κ, v) > 0 and f2(1; vn) > 0 implies that there exists
x ∈ (1, x(vn)) such that f2(x; vn) = 0, which contradicts the definition of x(vn). Hence
f ′2(x(vn); vn) ≤ 0, so f ′2(S2; v0) ≤ 0. Next, suppose f ′2(S2; v0) < 0. Then for ε small enough,
we have f2(S2 + ε;S1) < 0. By continuity of f2(x; v), there exists some δ > 0 such that
f2(S2 + ε;S1− δ) < 0, which contradicts the definition of S1. Therefore, f
′
2(S2; v0) = 0 and
(v0, S2) is the solution of the following equations:{
C1(κ; v0)S
z1
2 + C2(κ; v0)S
z2
2 = p+ (1− p)S2,
z1C1(κ; v0)S
z1−1
2 + z2C2(κ; v0)S
z2−1





2(x; v0) =∞ and f ′′2 (x; v0) > 0. Thus, there exists some b large enough such
that f ′2(b; v0) > 0, so S2 is bounded by b from above.
(2) Uniqueness. Suppose there exists another solution (v∗0, S
∗
2) to (2.24) and (2.25). First,
we assume v∗0 > v0. Then by Proposition 2.4.1 Part (b), W (x;κ, v
∗
0) > W (x;κ, v0) ≥
g(x) > p+ (1− p)x for x ≥ κ. Therefore, no such S∗2 ∈ (1,∞) could satisfy (2.24). Thus,
v∗0 ≤ v0. For
(q+(1−q)κ)z2
κ
≤ v∗0 < v0, we know p + (1− p)S2 = W (S2;κ, v0) > W (S2;κ, v∗0).
The strict convexity of W (x, κ, v∗0) implies that there must exist 0 < a1 < a2 such that
W (a1;κ, v
∗
0) = p + (1− p)a1 and W (a2;κ, v∗0) = p + (1− p)a2. The Mean Value Theorem
implies that there must exist a point c ∈ (a1, a2) satisfying W ′(c;κ, v∗0) = 1 − p. So,
W ′(a1;κ, v
∗
0) < 1− p and W ′(a2;κ, v∗0) > 1− p. Thus, there does not exist an S∗2 satisfying
(2.24) and (2.25) at the same time. Finally, when v∗0 < 0, C1(κ, v
∗
0) < 0. We can calculate
W (x;κ, v∗0) = z1C1(κ, v
∗
0)x




for all x > 0. Thus, no S∗2 exists that satisfies (2.25). Therefore, we have proved that
v0 = v
∗
0. Thus, we have f2(S
∗




2 ; v0) = 0. Since f2(x; v0) is a strictly
convex function of x on [1,∞), S∗2 is the unique point on [1,∞) satisfying f2(S∗2 ; v0) = 0
and f ′2(S
∗
2 ; v0) = 0. But, we have also shown that f2(S2; v0) = 0 and f
′
2(S2; v0) = 0 with
S2 > 1. Therefore, S
∗
2 = S2. 
Finally, in the following theorem, we propose the solution for V (x) and show it is indeed
the viscosity solution to (2.9).
Theorem 2.4.1. Suppose p < q. Consider the function h(x) in equation (2.19) and let
x∗ > κ be the unique root such that h
′(x∗) = 0.
a. If h(x∗) ≥ 0, then the value function V (x) is
V (x) =

g(x), x ∈ [0, S1],
W (x;S1, 1− q), x ∈ (S1, S2),
g(x), x ∈ [S2,∞),
(2.28)
where S1 ∈ [κ, 1) and S2 > 1 are the unique solutions of the system of equations,{
C1(S1, 1− q)Sz12 + C2(S1, 1− q)Sz22 = p+ (1− p)S2,
z1C1(S1, 1− q)Sz1−12 + z2C2(S1, 1− q)Sz2−12 = 1− p.
(2.29)
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b. If h1(x∗) < 0, then the value function V (x) is
V (x) =

g(x), x ∈ [0, κ],
W (x;κ, v0), x ∈ (κ, S2),
g(x), x ∈ [S2,∞),
(2.30)
where v0 ∈ (1− q,∞) and S2 > 1 are the unique solutions of the system of equations,{
C1(κ, v0)S
z1
2 + C2(κ, v0)S
z2
2 = p+ (1− p)S2,
z1C1(κ, v0)S
z1−1
2 + z2C2(κ, v0)S
z2−1
2 = 1− p.
(2.31)
Proof. (a) By Proposition 2.4.2 Part (a), we can find a unique pair (S1, S2) ∈ [κ, 1)×(1,∞)
such that the smooth fit condition holds at S2. Now, all we need to show is that (2.28) is
the viscosity solution of (2.9).
Sub-solution. Suppose ψ is a smooth test function satisfying ψ ≥ V and ψ(x) = V (x).
For x ∈ [0, S1] ∪ [S2,∞), V (x) = g(x) implies the viscosity sub-solution property of V (x).
For x ∈ (S1, S2), rψ(x) − Lψ(x) ≤ rV (x) − LV (x) = 0. It follows that the viscosity
sub-solution property holds for V (x).
Super-solution. Suppose ϕ is a smooth test function satisfying ϕ ≤ V and ϕ(x) = V (x).
For x ∈ (S1, S2), rϕ(x) − Lϕ(x) ≥ rV (x) − LV (x) = 0 and V (x) ≥ g(x) implies that the
viscosity super-solution property holds. For x ∈ (0, κ)∪ (κ, S1)∪ (S2,∞), rϕ(x)−Lϕ(x) =
rg(x) − Lg(x) ≥ 0. Thus, the viscosity super-solution inequality holds. Next, at x = κ,
the assumptions on ϕ give:








= ϕ′(κ−) = ϕ′(κ)








= ϕ′(κ+) = ϕ′(κ),
which leads to the inequality B ≤ ϕ(κ) ≤ 1 − q. However, B > 1 − q. Therefore, no
such smooth function ϕ exists and the super-solution condition holds vacuously. Finally,
at Si, i = 1, 2, S1 6= κ, since V − ϕ ≥ 0 and V (Si) − ϕ(Si) = 0, then V ′(Si) = ϕ′(Si).
Moreover, by Taylor’s Remainder Theorem,
V (x)− ϕ(x) = V (Si)− ϕ(Si) + (V ′(Si)− ϕ′(Si))(x− Si) +
1
2




(V ′′(c)− ϕ′′(c))(x− Si)2,
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so rϕ(Si) − Lϕ(Si) ≥ lim supx→Si rV (x) − LV (x) ≥ 0. Thus, the viscosity super-solution
property is satisfied at Si, i = 1, 2.
(b) By Proposition 2.4.2 Part (b), we can find a unique pair (v0, S2) ∈ [1− q,∞)× (1,∞)
such that the smooth fit condition holds at S2. Now, all we need to show is that (2.30) is
the viscosity solution of (2.9).
Sub-solution. Suppose ψ is a smooth test function satisfying ψ ≥ V and ψ(x) = V (x). For
x ∈ [0, κ] ∪ [S2,∞), V (x) = g(x) implies the viscosity sub-solution property of V (x). For
x ∈ (κ, S2), rψ(x)−Lψ(x) ≤ rV (x)−LV (x) = 0. It follows that the viscosity sub-solution
property holds for V (x).
Super-solution. Suppose ϕ is a smooth test function satisfying ϕ ≤ V and ϕ(x) = V (x).
For x ∈ (κ, S2), rϕ(x) − Lϕ(x) ≥ rV (x) − LV (x) = 0, and V (x) ≥ g(x) implies that
the viscosity super-solution property holds. For x ∈ (0, κ) ∪ (S2,∞), rV (x) − LV (x) =
rg(x) − Lg(x) ≥ 0 and the viscosity super-solution inequality holds. Next, at x = κ, the
assumptions on ϕ give:


















= ϕ′(κ+) = ϕ′(κ),
which leads to the inequality B ≤ ϕ(κ) ≤ v0. However, the strict convexity of W (x;κ, v)
implies v0 ≤ 1− p. So, v0 ≤ 1− p < 1 ≤ B . Therefore, no such smooth function ϕ exists
and the super-solution condition holds vacuously. Finally, at S2, since V − ϕ ≥ 0 and
V (S2)− ϕ(S2) = 0, then V ′(S2) = ϕ′(S2). Moreover, by Taylor’s Remainder Theorem,
V (x)− ϕ(x) = V (S2)− ϕ(S2) + (V ′(S2)− ϕ′(S2))(x− S2) +
1
2




(V ′′(c)− ϕ′′(c))(x− S2)2,











Then, we can deduce that ϕ
′′
(S2) ≤ lim infx→S2 V
′′
(x), so rϕ(S2)−Lϕ(S2) ≥ lim supx→S2 rV (x)−
LV (x) ≥ 0. Thus, the viscosity super-solution property holds at S2. 
2.5 Numerical Results
In this section, we apply the above results to see how the parameters affect the stop-
ping boundaries and the value function for different fee structures. By Theorem 2.4.1 we
conclude with the following steps to solve for V (x) when q > p for the infinite horizon case.
1. Solve h′(x∗) = 0 and calculate h(x∗).
2. If h(x∗) ≥ 0, then V (x) is of the form (2.28) and (S1, S2) are solutions of equation
(2.29).
3. If h(x∗) < 0, then V (x) is of the form (2.30) and (v0, S2) are solutions of equation
(2.31).
By applying the above algorithm we are able to provide the value function for different
fee structures. In particular, the following figures are obtained by fixing any two of the
three parameters r, δ, σ and letting the remaining parameter vary in its reasonable range.
From the plots, we can observe that the value function increases and the continuation
region becomes wider as r decreases or σ increases in all the fee structures, while δ has a
relatively small impact on the value function.
35




































Figure 2.1: Fair Price of the Investor’s Payoffs: Escrow First-Loss Fee Structure with
parameters x = 1, δ = 0.01, σ = 0.1, A = 0.1, B = 1, p = 0.5, q = 1. The solid black curve
is the payoff function.
We begin by considering the case in which the loss insurance is implemented by the
hedge fund manager placing cash in an escrow account (rather than investing in the fund’s
assets). In Figure 2.1 we vary the interest rate r, while holding all other parameters at their
benchmark values. The value function is a decreasing function of the interest rate. This
implies that the lower boundary increases with the interest rate, and the upper boundary
decreases with the interest rate. For low values of the interest rate (e.g. r = 0.01), we see
that S1 = κ = 0.9, and the smooth pasting condition fails to hold. This corresponds to
the hedge fund investor waiting until the entire escrow account has been consumed before
exiting the fund. We observe that while the upper boundary decreases with the interest
rate, even for low values of the interest rate it is not very high. Intuitively, once the hedge
fund assets have increased significantly, the downside protection provided by the insurance
component of the fee contract is worth far less to the investor than the cost that they are
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paying in terms of the high performance fee.
































Figure 2.2: Fair Price of the Investor’s Payoffs: Escrow First-Loss Fee Structure with
parameters x = 1, r = 0.05, σ = 0.1, A = 0.1, B = 1, p = 0.5, q = 1. The solid black curve
is the payoff function.
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Figure 2.3: Fair Price of the Investor’s Payoffs: Escrow First-Loss Fee Structure with
parameters x = 1, r = 0.05, δ = 0.01, A = 0.1, B = 1, p = 0.5, q = 1. The solid black curve
is the payoff function.
In Figure 2.2, we consider the impact of varying the fee for assets under management
δ. Although it is difficult to see from the figure, the value function is (not surprisingly) a
decreasing function of the fee for assets under management. The higher the fee the investor
has to pay for the hedge fund manager’s services, the less the contract is worth for them.
That being said, in a reasonable range of values both the value function and the exercise
boundaries are relatively insensitive to variations in the parameter δ.
The same cannot be said for the volatility parameter σ. As we see from Figure 2.3, the
value of σ can have a significant effect on both the value of the hedge fund investment and
the positions of the exercise boundaries. The hedge fund value function is an increasing
function of the volatility. This is a non-trivial observation, as the fee structure represents
a portfolio of options consisting of both long and short positions. The lower boundary
38
decreases and the upper boundary increases when σ increases. Again, this corresponds to
financial intuition. The insurance component of the contract is particularly valuable for
high levels of volatility, and the probability of a drop back into the region corresponding
to losses from a high value of the hedge fund assets is greater for higher levels of volatility.




































Figure 2.4: Fair Price of the Investor’s Payoffs: Non-escrow First-Loss Fee Structure with
parameters x = 1, δ = 0.01, σ = 0.1, A = 0.1, B = 1, p = 0.5, q = 1. The solid black curve
is the payoff function.
Next, we consider the case in which the hedge fund manager invests funds directly in the
fund assets (the “non-escrow case”). Investor losses are covered from the fund manager’s
share of the remaining assets, until that share is exhausted. Figure 2.4 considers different
values of the interest rate r, while Figures 2.5 and 2.6 consider varying the fee for assets
under management δ and the asset volatility σ respectively. We see that the behaviour and
levels of the value functions and the stopping boundaries are very similar to the escrow
case.
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Figure 2.5: Fair Price of the Investor’s Payoffs: Non-escrow First-Loss Fee Structure with
parameters x = 1, r = 0.05, σ = 0.1, A = 0.1, B = 1, p = 0.5, q = 1. The solid black curve
is the payoff function.
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Figure 2.6: Fair Price of the Investor’s Payoffs: Non-escrow First-Loss Fee Structure with
parameters x = 1, r = 0.05, δ = 0.01, A = 0.1, B = 1, p = 0.5, q = 1. The solid black curve
is the payoff function.
Table 2.1 presents all the exercise boundary estimates S1 and S2 for Figures 2.1-2.6.
Moreover, in section 2.3, a different parameterization β = 2r
σ2
and γ = 2δ
σ2
is introduced in
order to solve the optimal withdrawal problem. These intermediate parameters are also
presented in the table as well.
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Table 2.1: Summary of intermediate parameters and estimates of Figures 2.1-2.6
Figure 2.1
Red line β = 2, γ = 2, S1 = 0.9 = κ, S2 = 1.131
Green line β = 4, γ = 2, S1 = 0.935 > κ, S2 = 1.078
Blue line β = 10, γ = 2, S1 = 0.971 > κ, S2 = 1.035
Figure 2.2
Red line β = 10, γ = 0, S1 = 0.970 > κ, S2 = 1.040
Green line β = 10, γ = 2, S1 = 0.971 > κ, S2 = 1.035
Blue line β = 10, γ = 6, S1 = 0.973 > κ, S2 = 1.029
Figure 2.3
Red line β = 40, γ = 8, S1 = 0.993 > κ, S2 = 1.009
Green line β = 10, γ = 2, S1 = 0.971 > κ, S2 = 1.035
Blue line β = 2.5, γ = 0.5, S1 = 0.9 = κ, S2 = 1.150
Figure 2.4
Red line β = 2, γ = 2, S1 = 0.909 = κ, S2 = 1.130
Green line β = 4, γ = 2, S1 = 0.935 > κ, S2 = 1.078
Blue line β = 10, γ = 2, S1 = 0.971 > κ, S2 = 1.035
Figure 2.5
Red line β = 10, γ = 0, S1 = 0.970 > κ, S2 = 1.040
Green line β = 10, γ = 2, S1 = 0.971 > κ, S2 = 1.035
Blue line β = 10, γ = 6, S1 = 0.974 > κ, S2 = 1.029
Figure 2.6
Red line β = 40, γ = 8, S1 = 0.993 > κ, S2 = 1.009
Green line β = 10, γ = 2, S1 = 0.971 > κ, S2 = 1.035
Blue line β = 2.5, γ = 0.5, S1 = 0.909 = κ, S2 = 1.149
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Chapter 3
Optimal Withdrawal from Shared
Loss Fee Structures: The Finite
Horizon Case
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we study the problem of determining the optimal withdrawal time from
an investment in a hedge fund with a shared-loss fee structure when there is a finite
investment horizon T . In parallel with the standard American put option (see, e.g. Peskir
and Shiryaev (2006)), there is no longer a simple semi-analytical solution to the problem.
Nonetheless, we can derive various mathematical properties of the value function and
optimal stopping time, and employ numerical methods to calculate their solutions. The
basic properties of the continuation and stopping regions are inherited from the infinite
horizon case, i.e. there is an upper stopping boundary and a lower stopping boundary,
with the lower stopping boundary corresponding to the situation in which most or all
of the insurance value of the shared loss structure has been exhausted, and the upper
stopping boundary to the situation in which the insurance is nearly worthless (as the
fund is unlikely to generate significant losses), and the performance fee has become too
expensive. However, in the finite horizon case, these boundaries are time-dependent. When
considered as a function of time to expiration, both boundaries start at 1, and then tend
to the infinite horizon boundaries as time to expiration tends to infinity.1 The boundaries
1This essentially follows from the convergence of the value functions, limT→∞ v(x, T ) = V (x), see
Proposition 3.2.1, and Lemma 3.2.1. Preliminary numerical experiments (see Chapter 6) indicate that this
43
are both monotone, with the upper boundary being increasing and the lower boundary
being decreasing. The mathematical structure of the solution is similar to that which
arises for American installment options (see Ciurlia and Roko (2005) and Kimura (2009)).
Recall that for an installment option, the option premium is paid continuously, rather than
upfront. For an installment put, for example, this again leads to the situation in which
there are two monotone stopping boundaries; the lower boundary corresponds to early
exercise, as with the standard American put, while the upper boundary corresponds to the
situation when the option premium is too expensive given the probability that the option
will end up in the money.
Chen et al. (2020) studied the optimal stopping problem for a hedge fund fee structure
with no fee for assets under management. In this chapter, we derive new results, and
extend some of their results to the situation in which the contract features a fee for assets
under management. In particular, we prove basic properties of the stopping boundaries
that extend the results of Chen et al. (2020). We also present a new result deriving an early
exercise representation and a pair of coupled integral equations for the stopping boundaries.
Finally, following the probabilistic strategy of Lamberton (1995), we derive the asymp-
totic behaviour of the optimal stopping boundaries as the time to expiration tends to zero.
Aside from their intrinsic mathematical interest, these estimates can be helpful in approx-
imating the stopping boundaries as the starting point for analytical approximations (see,
e.g. Chen and Chadam (2007)), or for determining initial behaviour in numerical solutions
of the integral equations for the stopping boundaries (which are highly singular for small
times).
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The second section presents
the formulation of the mathematical problem of determining the best time to withdraw
from a hedge fund investment with a shared-loss fee structure with a positive fee for assets
under management and a finite investment horizon, and the characterization of the value
function as the solution of a variational inequality. The third section discusses the basic
shape of the stopping and continuation regions, in analogy with Chapter 2, as well as basic
properties (monotonicity and continuity) of the stopping boundaries. The fourth section
derives the early exercise premium representation of the investment value, as well as a pair
of coupled integral equations for the stopping boundaries. The fifth section presents the
asymptotic analysis of the stopping boundaries when time to expiration is small.
convergence appears to be quite fast. Use of the infinite horizon value function to approximate the finite
horizon value function and approximations of the boundary based on interpolating between the known
small-time behaviour and infinite horizon solution (similar to Chen and Chadam (2007)) are potential
topics for future research.
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3.2 Problem Formulation and Characterization of the
Value Function
In this section, we recall the characterization of the value function of the optimal stopping
problem for optimal withdrawal from a hedge fund investment with a shared-loss fee struc-
ture as the solution of a variational inequality. Recall that for all the optimal stopping
problems in this thesis, we assume that the underlying assets of the hedge fund satisfy:
dXxt = (r − δ)Xxt dt+ σXxt dWt, Xx0 = x, t ≥ 0, (3.1)




where r ≥ 0 is the risk-free rate, δ > 0 is the fee for assets under management (paid
continuously), σ > 0 is the volatility and Wt is a standard Brownian motion on the prob-
ability space (Ω,F ,Q) with filtration {Ft}∞t=0, the standard augmentation of the filtration
generated by W , satisfying the usual conditions. Then, the value function for the investor’s
problem of determining the optimal time to withdraw from the hedge fund in the finite
horizon T > 0 is:
v(x, T ) = sup
τ∈T[0,T ]
E[e−rτg(Xxτ )], (3.2)
where T[0,T ] is the set of all stopping times such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ T , and g(x) is the payoff
function for the first-loss and shared-loss fee structures:
g(x) =

A+Bx, 0 ≤ x ≤ κ
q + (1− q)x, κ ≤ x ≤ 1,
p+ (1− p)x, 1 ≤ x,
(3.3)
where B ≥ 1 ≥ q ≥ A ≥ 0, p ∈ (0, 1) and κ = (B − (1− q))−1(q − A).
Similar to the infinite horizon case, v(x, T ) solves the variational inequality
min
(
rv − Lv + ∂v
∂T
, v − g
)
= 0 (3.4)
in the viscosity sense, for which we use the following standard definition (e.g. Pham
(2009)).
Definition 3.2.1. Let W ∈ C([0,∞)× [0,∞),R). Then,
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1. W is a viscosity super-solution of (3.4) if
min
(
rW (x0, t0)− Lϕ(x0, t0) +
∂ϕ
∂T
(x0, t0),W (x0, t0)− g(x0)
)
≥ 0, (3.5)
for all smooth functions ϕ and all (x0, t0) ∈ (0,∞)× (0,∞) such that W −ϕ attains
a local minimum at (x0, t0).
2. W is a viscosity sub-solution of (3.4) if
min
(
rW (x0, t0)− Lψ(x0, t0) +
∂ψ
∂T
(x0, t0),W (x0, t0)− g(x0)
)
≤ 0, (3.6)
for all smooth functions ψ and all (x0, t0) ∈ (0,∞)× (0,∞) such that W −ψ attains
a local maximum at (x0, t0).
W is called a viscosity solution of (3.4) if it is both a super-solution and sub-solution.
The following proposition summarizes basic properties of the value function. While we
expect that it is a special case of a more general proposition, we are unaware of a precise
reference, and therefore include the proof for completeness. Similar results, based on the
same arguments, are given by Karatzas and Shreve (1998) for the American put and Chen
et al. (2020) for our problem with no fee for assets under management (the proof is identical
to that of the corresponding result in Chen et al. (2020), apart from the inclusion of the
parameter δ ≥ 0 giving the fee for assets under management).
Proposition 3.2.1. For x ∈ [0,∞), the value function v(x, T ) is increasing in x, increasing
in T and limT→∞ v(x, T ) = V (x), where V is the value function (2.2) for the infinite
horizon problem.
Proof. Define
J(x, T, τ) = E[e−rτg(Xxτ )],
where x ≥ 0 and τ ∈ T[0,T ]. Then, for y ≥ x,
J(y, T, τ)− J(x, T, τ) = E[e−rτ
(




because g(x) is an increasing function and Xyτ −Xxτ ≥ 0 for all stopping times τ ∈ T[0,T ].
Thus V (y, T ) = supτ∈T[0,T ] E[e
−rτg(Xyτ )] ≥ supτ∈T[0,T ] E[e
−rτg(Xxτ )] = v(x, T ). Hence,
v(x, T ) is increasing in x.
Since T1 ≤ T2 implies that T[0,T1] ⊂ T[0,T2] ⊂ T , the fact that g(x) = v(x, 0) ≤ v(x, T1) ≤
v(x, T2) ≤ V (x) is immediate and Ṽ (x) = limT→∞ v(x, T ) ≤ V (x) is well-defined. Let
τ ∗x = inf{t ≥ 0, Xxt /∈ (S1, S2)} be the optimal stopping time for the perpetual problem.
Then, by Fatou’s Lemma:
lim
T→∞







x∧T )g(Xxτ∗x∧T )] = E[e
−rτ∗xg(Xxτ∗x )] = V (x). (3.7)

Recall that V (x) = g(x) when p ≥ q. Then, Proposition 3.2.1 implies g(x) = V (x) ≥
v(x, T ) = g(x). Again, we only need to consider the case when q > p. The following
Theorem connects (3.4) to our optimal stopping problem (3.2).
Theorem 3.2.1. The value function is the unique viscosity solution of
min
(
rv − Lv + ∂v
∂T
, v − g
)
= 0, (3.8)
satisfying v(x, 0) = g(x), v(0, T ) = A, v(x, T ) ∼ g(x) as x → ∞ for all T > 0 and
limT→∞ v(x, T ) = V (x).
Proof. From Proposition 3.2.1, we can easily obtain v(x, T ) is locally bounded for all
(x, T ) ∈ [0,∞)× [0,∞). By Touzi (2013, Theorem 7.7, Pages 96-99), v(x, T ) is the unique
viscosity solution of (3.8). 
Next, define the sections of the stopping region and continuation region at each time
T as follows:
ST = {x|v(x, T ) = g(x)}, CT = {x|v(x, T ) > g(x)}. (3.9)
Notice that if T1 ≤ T2 then x ∈ ST2 implies that g(x) = v(x, T2) ≥ v(x, T1) ≥ g(x) so that
ST2 ⊆ ST1 . (3.10)
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The following properties of the sets in (3.9) generalize the case δ = 0 from Chen et al.
(2020).
Proposition 3.2.2. Suppose that q > p, then,
a. [0, κ] ⊆ ST .
b. 1 ∈ CT .
c. If a < 1 and a ∈ ST , then [0, a] ⊆ ST .
d. If b > 1 and b ∈ ST , then [b,∞] ⊆ ST .
Proof. a. Taking τ = 0 ∈ T[0,T ], we have g(x) ≤ v(x, T ). Since g(x) ≤ A + Bx and
e−rtXxt is a supermartingale we have v(x, T ) ≤ A + Bx. Thus, for x ∈ [0, κ], we
conclude v(x, T ) = A+Bx.
b. Suppose 1 ∈ ST . Since v(1, T ) is increasing in T, for any T ∗ < T , we have v(1, T ∗) =
g(1). Consider the test functions with the form ϕ(x, t) = −(t−T ∗)2 +Mn exp(n(x−
1)) + (1−Mn), where t ∈ (T ∗ − ε, T ∗ + ε), Mn = ξn and ξ ∈ (1− q, 1− p). Clearly,
ϕ(1, T ∗) = 1, and ϕ(x, t) < g(x) for x close to 1. Also, ∂ϕ
∂x
(1, t) = ξ, ∂ϕ
∂x2
(1, t) = nξ
and ∂ϕ
∂t
(x, T ∗) = 0. By the super-solution property, we know rϕ(1, T ∗)−Lϕ(1, T ∗) +
∂ϕ
∂t
(1, T ∗) ≥ 0, but
rϕ(1, T ∗)− Lϕ(1, T ∗) + ∂ϕ
∂t
(1, T ∗) = r − (r − δ)ξ − 1
2
σ2nξ + 0
= r(1− ξ) + δξ − 1
2
σ2nξ < 0
for n large enough, which contradicts the super-solution property. So 1 ∈ CT .
c. If a ≤ κ, [0, κ] ⊆ ST implies [0, a] ⊆ ST . So we only consider the case when κ <
a < 1. Suppose a < 1 and a ∈ ST . If [0, a] ⊆ ST is not true, then there exists a
x̃T ∈ (κ, a] such that v(x̃T , T ) > g(x̃T ). Let h(x, T ) = v(x, T )− g(x). On x ∈ [κ, a],
we have h(κ, T ) = h(a, T ) = 0 since κ and a are in the stopping region. Noting
that h(x̃T , T ) > 0, for any fixed T , we must have some points x
∗
T ∈ (κ, a) such
that h(x∗T , T ) > 0 attains a local maximum. In other words, we have the following
relations,
h(x∗T , T ) > 0, x
∗
T ∈ CT , hx(x∗T , T ) = 0, and hxx(x∗T , T ) ≤ 0.
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Now, it can be easily obtained that





T , T )− (r − δ)xhx(x∗T , T )
+ hT (x
∗
T , T ) ≥ 0. (3.11)
However, x∗T ∈ CT implies that rV (x∗T , T ) − LV (x∗T , T ) + VT (x∗T , T ) = 0 and we
have shown rg − Lg > 0 for x ∈ (0, κ) ∪ (κ, 1) ∪ (1,∞). Therefore, we must have
rh(x∗T , T )−Lh(x∗T , T )+hT (x∗T , T ) = r(v(x∗T , T )−g(x∗T , T ))−L(V (x∗T , T )−g(x∗T , T ))+
hT (x
∗
T , T ) < 0, which contradicts (3.11).
d. Recall that [S2,∞) is the stopping region for the infinite horizon case. So, if b ≥ S2,
then we have g(x) = V (x) ≥ v(x, T ) = g(x) for all x ≥ S2 by Proposition 3.2.1.
Therefore, we only need to consider the case when 1 < b < S2. Now, suppose
1 < b < S2 and b ∈ ST . If [b,∞] ⊆ ST is not true, then there exists a x̃T ∈ (b, S2)
such that v(x̃T , T ) > g(x̃T ). Then, similar to Part c), we let h(x, T ) = v(x, T )−g(x).
On x ∈ [b, S2], we have h(b, T ) = h(S2, T ) = 0 since b and S2 are in the stopping
region. Note that h(x̃T , T ) > 0, then for any fixed T , we must have some points
x∗T ∈ (b, S2) such that h(x∗T , T ) > 0 attains a local maximum. In other words, we
have the following relations,
h(x∗T , T ) > 0, x
∗
T ∈ CT , hx(x∗T , T ) = 0, and hxx(x∗T , T ) ≤ 0.
Now, it can be easily obtained that





T , T )− (r − δ)xhx(x∗T , T )
+ hT (x
∗
T , T ) ≥ 0. (3.12)
However, x∗T ∈ CT implies that rv(x∗T , T )−Lv(x∗T , T ) + vT (x∗T , T ) = 0 and in Propo-
sition 2.2.1 we have shown rg−Lg > 0 for x ∈ (0, κ)∪ (κ, 1)∪ (1,∞). Therefore, we
must have rh(x∗T , T )−Lh(x∗T , T )+hT (x∗T , T ) = r(v(x∗T , T )−g(x∗T , T ))−L(v(x∗T , T )−
g(x∗T , T )) + hT (x
∗
T , T ) < 0, which contradicts (3.12).

By Proposition 3.2.2, we can define the two stopping boundaries at time to maturity
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T as the following,
S−(T ) := inf{x|v(x, T ) > g(x)}, S+(T ) := sup{x|v(x, T ) > g(x)}.
We have from (3.10) that S−(T ) is decreasing in T and S+(T ) is increasing in T .
Lemma 3.2.1. 1. S−(T ) and S+(T ) are continuous functions.
2. limT↓0 S−(T ) = limT↓0 S+(T ) = 1.
3. The smooth-fit condition holds on the upper boundary, limx→S+(T ) V (x, T ) = g
′(S+(T )) =
1− p. Furthermore, if S1 > κ, the smooth fit condition holds on the lower boundary
as well, i.e. limx→S−(T ) Vx(x, T ) = g
′(S−(T )) = 1− q.
4. limT→∞ S−(T ) = S1, limT→∞ S+(T ) = S2.
Proof. The first two results can be proved using the argument in Theorem 3.1 in De
Angelis (2015), while the third result can be proved following the same strategy as for
the American put, see Peskir and Shiryaev (2006, pages 381–382). For the fourth result,
let S̃2 := limT→∞ S+(T ). Clearly S̃2 ∈ [1, S2]. Suppose that S̃2 < S2. Because S+(T ) is
increasing, S̃2 ∈ ST for all T . Thus V (S̃2) = limT→∞ v(S̃2, T ) = limT→∞ g(S̃2) = g(S̃2),
contradicting the definition of S2. The proof for the other case is similar.
3.3 Early Exercise Representation and Integral Equa-
tions
We now derive the early exercise representation for v, and a pair of coupled integral equa-
tions for S±(T ). Throughout, we assume that q > p, and S1 > κ. From the above, we
have that v solves: 
v(x, 0) = g(x),
limx→S−(T ) v(x, T ) = q + (1− q)S−(T ),
limx→S−(T ) vx(x, T ) = 1− q,
limx→S+(T ) v(x, T ) = p+ (1− p)S+(T ),
limx→S+(T ) vx(x, T ) = 1− p.
(3.13)
Along with the information that S−(T ) and S+(T ) never intersect with each other and are
locally bounded and continuous, we can find a representation for v(x, T ) by applying the
change-of variable formula on curves Peskir (2005).
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Theorem 3.3.1. v defined by (3.2) satisfies:





B + (1− q −B)Φ(d1(x, κ, T − τ))








A(1− Φ(d2(x, κ, T − τ)))




where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function,
d1(x, y, t) =




, d2(x, y, t) = d1(x, y, t)− σ
√
t.
and ve(x, T ) := E[e−rTg(XxT )] is the corresponding European-style value function.
Proof. Note that the variable T is time to maturity, which implies that our time is running
backward. Since it is convenient to apply the change-of-variable formula when time is
running forward, we introduce the following notation. Define
ṽ(x, t;T ) := v(x, T − t), Z̃(x, t;T ) := e−rtv(x, t;T ),
S̃−(t) := S−(T − t), S̃+(t) := S+(T − t),
where ṽ(Xt, t;T ) is the value process at the current time t, 0 ≤ t ≤ T and Z̃(Xt, t;T ) is
the discounted value process at time t, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Applying Peskir’s change-of-variable
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formula (Peskir, 2005, Theorem 2.1, Remark 2.3 and Remark 2.5) on Z̃(Xt, t;T ) leads to





























































, i = 1, 2 (3.16)



















Substituting the above into (3.15), we can verify that




















Next, knowing that ṽ(Xt, t;T ) = g(Xt) on the stopping region,
ṽ(Xt, t;T ) =1{Xt≤κ}(A+BXt) + 1{κ<Xt≤S̃−(t)}(q + (1− q)Xt)
+ 1{S̃−(t)<Xt<S̃+(t)}V (Xs, s) + 1{Xt≥S̃+(t)}(p+ (1− p)Xt).
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For simplicity, we define
f1(x, t) := 1{x<κ}(A+Bx) + 1{κ<x<S̃−(t)}(q + (1− q)x) + 1{x>S̃+(t)}(p+ (1− p)x)
∂f1(x, t)
∂x
:= 1{x<κ}B + 1{κ<x<S̃−(t)}(1− q) + 1{x>S̃+(t)}(1− p).
Then it is easy to obtain the following expressions,













+ 1{Xt>S̃+(t)}(1− p), (3.19)
∂2ṽ(Xt, t;T )
∂x2











Substituting (3.18), (3.19), (3.20) and (3.21) into (3.17), we have









































































































Note that on the continuation region, v(x, T ) satisfies the PDE Lv − rv − vT = 0, so
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ṽt + Lṽ − rṽ = 0. Thus, we can further simplify (3.22) as follows,



















Taking expectations and applying Fubini’s Theorem on (3.23), we obtain,
E[e−rT ṽ(XT , T ;T )] =ṽ(X0, 0;T ) +
∫ T
0











e−rt (E [αXt]− E[f1(Xt, t)]) dt.
Note that ṽ(XT , T ;T ) = g(XT ), so E[e
−rT ṽ(XT , T ;T )] = E[e
−rTg(XT )]. After rearranging
terms, the value function v(x, 0;T ) has the early exercise premium integral representation:







e−rt (E[f1(Xt, t)]− E [αXt]) dt. (3.24)
Now, we can calculate the expectations in (3.24) separately. First, we write down each
expectation explicitly
ve(x, T ) =e
−rT (E[1{XT<κ}(A+BXT )] + E[1{κ<XT<1}(q + (1− q)XT )]
+ E[1{XT>1}(p+ (1− p)XT )]), (3.25)
E [αXt] = E[1{Xt<κ}BXt + 1{κ<Xt<S̃−(t)}(1− q)Xt + 1{Xt>S̃+(t)}(1− p)Xt], (3.26)
E[f1(Xt, t)] =E[1{Xt<κ}(A+BXt) + 1{κ<Xt<S̃−(t)}(q + (1− q)Xt) + 1{Xt>S̃+(t)}(p+ (1− p)Xt)]
=E[1{Xt<κ}A+ 1{κ<Xt<S̃−(t)}q + 1{Xt>S̃+(t)}p] + E [αXt] . (3.27)
55
Note that since Xt follows a log-normal distribution, we can easily obtain:
E [αXt] = xe
(r−δ)t
(
B + (1− q −B)Φ(d1(x, κ, t)− (1− q)Φ(d1(x, S̃−(t), t))
+ (1− p)Φ(d1(x, S̃+(t), t))
)
, (3.28)
E[f1(Xt, t)]− E [αXt] = A(1− Φ(d2(x, κ, t)))
+ q(Φ(d2(x, κ, t))− Φ(d2(x, S̃−(t), t))
+ pΦ(d2(x, S̃+(t), t))). (3.29)
Next, substituting (3.28) and (3.29) into (3.24) yields the following integral representation
for ṽ(X0, 0;T ):





B + (1− q −B)Φ(d1(x, κ, t)








A(1− Φ(d2(x, κ, t)))
+ q(Φ(d2(x, κ, t))− Φ(d2(x, S̃−(t), t)) + pΦ(d2(x, S̃+(t), t)))
)
dt. (3.30)
After reverting to our original notation, this is the desired result. 
By Theorem 3.3.1 and the boundary conditions (3.13), the optimal stopping boundaries
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S−(T ) and S+(T ) satisfy the following coupled pair of integral equations:






B + (1− q −B)Φ(d1(S−(T ), κ, T − τ)








A(1− Φ(d2(S−(T ), κ, T − τ)))
+ q(Φ(d2(S−(T ), κ, T − τ))− Φ(d2(S−(T ), S−(τ), T − τ))
+ pΦ(d2(S−(T ), S+(τ), T − τ))
)
dτ (3.31)






B + (1− q −B)Φ(d1(S+(T ), κ, T − τ)








A(1− Φ(d2(S+(T ), κ, T − τ)))
+ q(Φ(d2(S+(T ), κ, T − τ))− Φ(d2(S+(T ), S−(τ), T − τ))
+ pΦ(d2(S+(T ), S+(τ), T − τ))
)
dτ, (3.32)
along with the conditions limT→0+ S−(T ) = 1 and limT→0+ S+(T ) = 1, by Lemma 3.2.1.
3.4 Exercise Boundaries Near Maturity
In this section, we study the asymptotic behaviour of the stopping boundaries S±(T ) for
small T . In particular, we show that as T ↘ 0:
S±(T ) ∼ 1± σ
√
T (− log T ) (3.33)
Throughout, we assume that the parameters are such that S1 > κ. We follow the strategy
employed by Lamberton (1995) in the case of the American put. Translated into our
context, this consists of the following steps:
 Show that for the European option with payoff g, and price ve(x, T ) = EQ[e−rTg(XxT )],













 Derive the small-time behaviour of Se±(T ).
 Show that for small T , the boundaries S±(T ) are close to Se±(T ). In particular, for
T small enough, there exists a C > 0 such that:
0 ≤ Se−(T )− S−(T ) ≤ C
√
T , 0 ≤ S+(T )− Se+(T ) ≤ C
√
T . (3.34)
 Infer the asymptotic behaviour of S±(T ) from that of Se±(T ).
Implementing the strategy in this case is significantly more complicated than in the case
of the American put covered by Lamberton (1995), for two main reasons. First of all, we
need to deal with two boundaries rather than a single one. Secondly, our payoff function
is more complicated; in particular it lacks the convexity that aids in the analysis of the
American put.
We need the following simple results, whose proofs are contained in Appendix B.
Lemma 3.4.1. Let Xxt = x exp{(r − δ + σ
2
2
)t+ σWt}. Then, for 0 ≤ a ≤ b <∞,
Q[a < Xxt < b] = Φ(d2(x, a, t))− Φ(d2(x, b, t)), (3.35)
EQ[1{a<Xxt <b}X
x
t ] = xe
(r−δ)t(Φ(d1(x, a, t))− Φ(d1(x, b, t)), (3.36)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function,
d1(x, y, t) =




, and d2(x, y, t) = d1(x, y, t)− σ
√
t.
Lemma 3.4.2. Let C(x,K, T ) = E[e−rT max(XxT −K, 0)] denote the price of a European
call option with strike price K, maturity date T , and current stock value x. Then as T ↘ 0:




T ), if x = K,
o(
√
T ), if x 6= K. (3.37)
Lemma 3.4.3. a. Suppose the function f1(x) is smooth on the interval [a1, b1]. If the
following conditions are satisfied
1. f1(a1) < 0, f1(b1) > 0, f
′
1(a1) > 0, f
′
1(b1) > 0.
2. f1(x) has a unique inflection point x2 ∈ (a1, b1) satisfying f
′′
1 (x2) = 0. Moreover,
f ′′1 (x) < 0 for x < x2 and f
′′
1 (x) > 0 for x > x2.
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3. For any point x1 ∈ (a1, b1) such that f ′1(x1) = 0, f1(x1) < 0.
Then f1(x) = 0 has a unique solution on the interval (a1, b1).
b. Suppose the function f2(x) is smooth and strictly convex on the interval [a2,∞) with
f2(a2) > 0. If there exists a constant b2 such that f2(x) ≤ 0 for all x ≥ b2, then the
equation f2(x) = 0 has a unique solution on the interval (a2,∞).
Proposition 3.4.1. There exists Te > 0 such that for all T ∈ (0, Te], ve(1, T ) > 1, and
there exists a unique Se−(T ) ∈ (κ, 1) and a unique Se+(T ) ∈ (1,∞) satisfying ve(Se−(T ), T ) =
g(Se−(T )) and ve(S
e
+(T ), T ) = g(S
e
+(T )) respectively.
Proof. Noting that g(x) = (A+Bx)− (B − 1 + q)(x− κ)+ + (q − p)(x− 1)+, we have:
ve(x, T ) = Ae
−rT + xe−δTB − (B − 1 + q)C(x, κ, T ) + (q − p)C(x, 1, T ). (3.38)
Let uT (x) = ve(x, T ) − q − (1 − q)x. Recalling that κ = (q − A)(B − 1 + q)−1 and using
(3.37), we have:
uT (κ) = Ae
−rT + κBe−δT − q − (1− q)κ− (B − 1 + q)C(κ, κ, T ) + (q − p)C(κ, 1, T )
≤ Ae−rT + κB − q − (1− q)κ− (B − 1 + q)C(κ, κ, T ) + (q − p)C(κ, 1, T )
= Ae−rT − q + κ(B − 1 + q)− (B − 1 + q)C(κ, κ, T ) + (q − p)C(κ, 1, T )
= A(e−rT − 1)− (B − 1 + q)C(κ, κ, T ) + (q − p)C(κ, 1, T ). (3.39)
By (3.37) and the fact that e−rT − 1 = O(T ), it can be verified that C(κ, κ, T ) = O(
√
T )
converges slower than the other terms for T small. Since C(κ, κ, T ) is always positive, we
must have uT (κ) < 0 for some T small enough. Similarly, we also have
uT (1) =Ae
−rT + (Be−δT − 1)− (B − 1 + q)C(1, κ, T ) + (q − p)C(1, 1, T ) > 0 (3.40)
for T sufficiently small (implying Ve(1, T ) > 1). Therefore, we can conclude that there
must exist a T1 small enough such that for all T ≤ T1, uT (κ) < 0 and uT (1) > 0. Next,
differentiating uT (x) with respect to x, we obtain
u′T (x) = B(e
−δT − 1) + (B − 1 + q)(1− e−δTΦ(d1(x, κ, T ))
+ (q − p)e−δTΦ(d1(x, 1, T )), (3.41)
from which it immediately follows that u′T (κ) > 0 and u
′
T (1) > 0 for T small enough. Now,
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differentiating with respect to x again we have










ϕ(d1(x, 1, T )). (3.42)





< 0, we have:
u′′T (x) =











Let hT (x) = −(B − 1 + q) + (q − p)e−C1d1(x,κ,T )−
1
2
C21 , so that the roots of hT are the
same as those of u′′T . It can easily be verified that limx→0+ hT (x) = −(B − 1 + q) < 0,
limx→∞ hT (x) =∞ and hT (x) is strictly increasing in x. So for each fixed T we must have
a unique root x2(T ) ∈ (0,∞) such that hT (x2(T )) = 0. Letting C2 = q−pB−1+q , a simple
calculation yields


















Moreover, since κ < κ
1
2 < 1 and x2(T ) converges to κ
1
2 as T → 0, there must exist a
T2 small enough such that x2(T ) ∈ (κ, 1) for all T ≤ T2. Taking Te small enough, we have
that uT (κ) < 0, uT (1) > 0, u
′
T (κ) > 0, u
′
T (1) > 0, and u
′′
T is strictly negative on (κ, x2(T )),
and strictly positive on (x2(T ), 1) for T ≤ Te. Finally, substituting u′T (x1(T )) = 0 into the
definition of uT (x) and simplifying yields:
uT (x1(T )) = q(e
−rT − 1)− (q − A)(1− Φ(d2(x1(T ), κ, T )))
− (q − p)e−rTΦ(d2(x1(T ), 1, T )) < 0 (3.45)
Lemma 3.4.3 (a) implies that uT (x) = 0 must attain a unique root on (κ, 1) for every fixed
T ≤ Te, i.e. there is a unique Se−(T ) such that ve(Se−(T ), T ) = g(Se−(T )).
To prove ve(x, T ) = g(x) attains a unique root on (1,∞), we let vT (x) = ve(x, T )− p−
(1−p)x. Note that uT (1) = vT (1). So, vT (1) > 0 for T small enough. Since v′′T (x) = u′′T (x),
v′′T (x) > 0 on (1,∞) and vT (x) is strictly convex on (1,∞) for T small enough. Moreover,
since ve(x, T ) ≤ v(x, T ) = g(x) for x ≥ S+(T ) and 1 < S+(T ) ≤ S2 < ∞, it can be easily
verified that vT (x) = ve(x, T )−p−(1−p)x ≤ 0 for all x ≥ S+(T ). By Lemma 3.4.3 (b), we
obtain that there exists a unique root Se+(T ) ∈ (1,∞) satisfying Ve(Se+(T ), T ) = g(Se+(T ))
for small enough T .
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The following depends only on the fact that v(x, T ) ≥ ve(x, T ).
Lemma 3.4.4. For T ≤ Te:
S−(T ) ≤ Se−(T ) ≤ Se+(T ) ≤ S+(T ) (3.46)
Proof. Since v(x, T ) ≥ ve(x, T ), we have g(S−(T )) = v(S−(T ), T ) ≥ ve(S−(T ), T ) and
g(S+(T )) = v(S+(T ), T ) ≥ ve(S+(T ), T ). Since ve > g on (Se−(T ), Se+(T )), we must have
Se−(T ) ≥ S−(T ) and Se+(T ) ≤ S+(T ).
We next give a rough result on the rate of convergence of the boundaries Se−(T ) and
Se+(T ) to one in small-time (Lamberton (1995, Lemma 2.2) proves an analogous property











Proof. By the previous Lemma, we have
1 = lim
T→0+
S−(T ) ≤ lim
T→0+
Se−(T ) ≤ lim
T→0+
Se+(T ) ≤ lim
T→0+
S+(T ) = 1. (3.47)
Next, note that for T small enough, we have a unique Se−(T ) such that q+ (1− q)Se−(T ) =
Ve(S
e
−(T ), T ). Then, by (3.38), and a simple rearrangement, we obtain
A(e−rT − 1) + Se−(T )B(e−δT − 1) + (q − p)C(Se−(T ), 1, T )
− (B − 1 + q)
(
C(Se−(T ), κ, T )− (Se−(T )− κ)
)
= 0. (3.48)




























(B − 1 + q)
(







By Lemma 3.4.2 and elementary calculus, all the terms on the right hand side of the above
equation tend to zero, except for the “put-option” term. Thus:

























1− Se−(T ) exp
(






























where Z ∼ N(0, 1), and we have used Fatou’s Lemma. If η1 ∈ [0,∞) then we get η1 ≥
E[max(η1 − σZ, 0)], which leads to a contradiction as Q({η1 − σZ < 0}) > 0 implies
E[max(η1 − σZ, 0)] > η1 − σE[Z] = η1. Thus η1 =∞. The proof for Se+(T ) is similar.

















2 ∼ (q − p)σ







2 ∼ (q − p)σ





1− Se−(T ) ∼ σ
√
T (− log T ), and Se+(T )− 1 ∼ σ
√
T (− log T ). (3.51)
Proof. Let y(T ) = Se−(T ) for convenience. A simple rearrangement of ve(y(T ), T ) = q +
(1− q)y(T ) yields:
E[e−rTg(Xy(T )T )] = qe














q(1− e−rT ) + (1− q)y(T )(1− e−δT ) = E[e−rT
(
1{Xy(T )T ≤κ}






(p− q + (q − p)Xy(T )T )
)
]. (3.53)
Noting that q(1−e−rT )+(1−q)y(T )(1−e−δT ) ∼ (rq+(1−q)δ)T and limT→0+ E[e−rT
(
1{XT≤κ}(A−
q + (B − 1 + q)Xy(T )T )
)
]/T = 0, (3.53) becomes
(rq + (1− q)δ)T
q − p












By Lemma 3.4.5, we have limT→0+ α1(T ) =∞ and limT→0+
√
Tα1(T ) = 0, from which we
obtain:







with Z ∼ N(0, 1). Next, let






























T |α1(T )|Q[Z > α1(T )]. (3.57)
Since limT→0+ α1(T ) = ∞ and limT→0+
√
Tα1(T ) = 0, both terms in (3.57) are o(T ) and
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we have |f(T )− E[σ
√
T (Z − α1(T ))1{Z>α1(T )}]| = o(T ). Then, from (3.55), we have:










































2 ∼ α1(T )2e
α1(T )
2
2 ∼ (q − p)σ




where we have used that ψ1(T ) − α1(T ) = O(
√




=∞, it is then elementary that 1− y(T ) ∼ − log(y(T )) ∼ σ
√
T (− log T ).
The proof for Se+(T ) is similar. 
To conclude, we must show that S−(T ), S+(T ) are sufficiently close (within
√
T ) to
the corresponding “European” boundaries Se−(T ), S
e
+(T ). To accomplish this, we need the
following bounds on the derivative of v, whose proof is given in the appendix.










v(·, T ) ≤ (1− p) + o(1) (3.62)
Proposition 3.4.2. There exist constants C > 0 and T ′ > 0 such that for all 0 < T ≤ T ′,








Proof. Note that v(x, T ) is a classical solution of vT = Lv − rv on (S−(T ), S+(T )) and
∂v
∂x
(S−(T ), T ) = 1− q. Taylor’s formula yields:
v(Se−(T ), T ) = q + (1− q)Se−(T ) +




(ξ1(T ), T ),
= ve(S
e
−(T ), T ) +




(ξ1(T ), T ),
where ξ1(T ) ∈ (S−(T ), Se−(T )). The early exercise premium representation (3.14), together
with the facts that 0 6 Φ 6 1 and κ < Se−(T ) ≤ 1 yields:




(ξ1(T ), T ) = v(S
e
−(T ), T )− ve(Se−(T ), T ) ≤ KT (3.65)
for some K ≥ 0. Using S−(T ) < ξ1(T ) < Se−(T ) and ∂v∂T (x, T ) ≥ 0 gives:
∂2v
∂x2






(ξ1(T ), T )− (r − δ)ξ1(T )
∂v
∂x




((v(ξ1(T ), T )− ξ1(T )
∂v
∂x
(ξ1(T ), T )))
≥ 2r
σ2ξ1(T )2
(q + (1− q)ξ1(T )− ξ1(T )
∂v
∂x
(ξ1(T ), T )) ≥ c > 0,
for T small enough, by Lemma 3.4.6. Thus
(Se−(T )− S−(T ))2 ≤ C1T ⇒ Se−(T )− S−(T ) ≤ C1
√
T , (3.66)
for some C1 > 0 and 0 < T ≤ T1. The proof of (3.64) is similar.
Finally, by Theorem 3.4.1, we can easily obtain
σ
√
T (− log T ) ∼ 1− S−(T ), σ
√
T (− log T ) ∼ S+(T )− 1. (3.67)
3.5 Conclusion
Chapters 2 and 3 analyze optimal stopping problems for a investor with a piecewise linear
payoff function, where the underlying follows a geometric Brownian motion, corresponding
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to a hedge fund with a continuous fee for assets under management deducted (or, equiv-
alently, the price process for a stock paying a continuous dividend yield). We present a
complete solution of the problem in the infinite horizon case. In the finite horizon case, we
describe the shape of the continuation region, characterize the stopping boundaries using




Performance Measures of Hedge
Fund Investments and the Myth of
Fee Diversification
4.1 Introduction
When considering the fee structure of any investment management relationship, both sides
must be concerned with the incentives the contract provides to their counterparty. Man-
agers often want to entice further investment in order to increase assets under management,
and thus must ensure that the fee structure is appealing to investors (while still being lu-
crative for themselves). Investors face a classical principal-agent problem, and must ensure
that managers are properly motivated to run the portfolio in the best interests of the
investors for whom they work.
Typically, the fee structure of a hedge fund consists of two parts: a management fee and
a performance fee (perhaps restricted by a high-water mark provision). The management
fee is charged as a percentage of assets under management and the performance fee is
charged as a percentage of the investor’s profits. For instance, a traditional fee structure
consists of a management fee of 2% of assets under management and a performance fee of
20% of net profits.
Hedge funds have faced intense scrutiny since the financial crisis, as the fees they
charge investors have been outsized compared to the returns they are posting as a group.1
1https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-07/new-york-illinois-pension-funds-say-hedge-
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Furthermore, it is unclear whether the option-like structure of the manager’s payoff under
traditional schemes might lead managers to undertake riskier strategies that may be at odds
with the risk aversion of investors.2 In recent years, innovative fee structures have emerged
aiming at better alignment between investors’ interests and the hedge fund’s business
objectives. An example is the class of first-loss fee structures (see Banzaca (2012) for a
description). In these structures, in return for a higher performance fee, the hedge fund
manager provides some downside protection to the investors on their losses. Fee innovation
has led to discussions and negotiations between investors and managers on the optimal fee
to be used in certain situations, amplifying the universe of available fee structures by
mixing different structures together. One example is the shared-loss structure, which can
be considered as a mixture of the classical structure and the first-loss structure. Under a
shared-loss agreement, rather than covering all investor losses up to a certain limit, the
manager will provide compensation for a proportion of the investor’s losses (again subject
to a ceiling).
In analogy with the concept of diversification from portfolio theory, it may be posited
that the optimal fee structure from the fund investor’s point of view should be a shared-
loss structure, i.e. a combination of the extremes. In particular, the hypothesis3 is that
by making investments subject to different fee structures (even on identical or highly
correlated underlying assets), diversification would reduce risk and therefore lead to an
improved risk-return tradeoff.4 Were such a diversification effect to exist, it would show
up not in the (risk-neutral) valuation of the fee structures, but rather when examining the
risk-return tradeoff among fee structures.
In Djerroud et al. (2016), the fairness of the prevailing levels of hedge fund fees was
investigated in terms of risk-neutral valuation. In this chapter we put the hypothesis of
fee diversification to the test by examining the problem of an investor who may choose
any combination of the first loss and classical fee structures, and seeks to maximize either
the Sharpe ratio or the Sortino ratio of their final payoff, evaluated using real-world prob-
abilities. We demonstrate that for the vast majority of fund mean returns and volatilities,
there is no fee diversification effect: either the first-loss structure or the classical structure
is optimal for the investor. We also identify the regions of the parameter space in which
funds-fees-too-high.
2For further discussion on this point, see He and Kou (2018), Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2007), and
Hodder and Jackwerth (2007).
3Luis Seco, personal communication, based on ideas expressed by market practitioners at several
industry conferences.
4The payouts with different fee structures on the same fund are comonotonic, but not perfectly corre-
lated.
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fee diversification prevails, and demonstrate that even in these regions the effect of fee
diversification is not large.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the payouts to
hedge fund investors under mixed fee structures. Section 3 summarizes analytical results
regarding the Sharpe ratio (and its maximization) and the Sortino ratio for mixed fee
structures. Section 4 presents numerical examples. Section 5 concludes. Technical details
and derivations of results are presented in Appendix C.
4.2 Portfolios of Fee Structures
Let Xxt be the value of the hedge fund’s assets at time t, assuming a value of x at the
initial date. Further, let m1, and α1 denote the management fee and performance fee for
the traditional fee structure, and m2, and α2 denote the management fee and performance
fee for the first-loss fee structure. We assume the management fees are proportional to the
initial investment x and performance fees are proportional to the final hedge fund value
XxT .






XxT −m1x− α1(XxT −m1x− x), XxT ≥ x+m1x,
XxT −m1x, XxT < x+m1x,
(4.1)





XxT −m2x− α2(XxT −m2x− x), XxT ≥ x+m2x,
x, x+m2x− cx ≤ XxT < x+m2x,
XxT −m2x+ cx, XxT < x+m2x− cx,
(4.2)
where c is the deposit amount, giving the fraction of the initial investment that is insured
(see Djerroud et al. (2016)).
5Note that in this chapter, we assume that the management fee is paid upfront, rather than on a
continuous basis, as in Chapters 2 and 3. Although management fees are paid according to a determined
schedule (usually monthly or quarterly Djerroud et al. (2016)), for simplicity, we will assume a single
payment at the end of a fixed term T.
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Figure 4.1: Investor’s Payoffs: Escrow First-Loss Fee Structure versus Traditional Fee
Structure with parameters x = 1,m1 = m2 = 0.01, c = 0.1, α1 = 0.4 and α2 = 0.5.
Now, let ω1 ≥ 0 and ω2 ≥ 0 denote the proportion of the fund invested in the traditional
fee structure and first-loss fee structure respectively, where ω1+ω2 = 1. Then, the investor’s
final payoff becomes
g(XxT ) = g1(ω1X
x
T ) + g2(ω2X
x
T ) = ω1g1(X
x
T ) + ω2g2(X
x
T ), (4.3)
where the second equation follows since gi(ωiX
x
T ) = gi(X
ωix
T ) = ωigi(X
x
T ), for i = 1, 2,
ωi ≥ 0.
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4.3 Performance Ratio Maximization with Portfolios
of Fee Structures






E[g(XxT )]− (1 + r)x√
Var[g(XxT )]
, (4.4)
where r(T ) = g(XxT )/x− 1 is the fund investor’s return, r is the risk-free interest rate and
ω = (ω1, ω2). Note that maximizing the investor’s SR in terms of g2(ω2X
x
T ) alone will
lead to c = 1, which is unrealistic. Therefore, c should be held in a reasonable range and
a combination of the traditional fees structure and first-loss fee structure is a reasonable
approach.
We assume that the investor seeks to maximize the Sharpe Ratio SR(ω). Let Y1 be the
excess profit (above an investment at the risk-free rate) of an investment in the classical
fund scheme (ω1 = 1), and Y2 be the excess profit of an investment in the first-loss structure
(ω2 = 1). Let µ̃i = E[Yi], i = 1, 2, σ̃2i = Var[Yi], i = 1, 2 and σ̃12 = Cov[Y1, Y2].





































The proof can be found in Appendix C. By the above results, one can distinguish
between the cases for which there exists a non-trivial asset allocation for the traditional
fee structure and the first-loss fee structure (ω∗i > 0 for i = 1, 2), and when full investment
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in one fee structure is optimal in terms of the Sharpe ratio. The results can be understood
in terms of the Sharpe ratios SRi =
µ̃i
σ̃i
, i = 1, 2 of the two payoffs, and their correlation
ρ = corr(Y1, Y2) = σ̃12/σ̃1σ̃2.
6 Assuming that µ̃i > 0, if the correlation is less than the




}, then there is enough potential for diversification that the
optimal portfolio will have a positive investment in each fee structure. Otherwise, all of
the wealth will be invested in the fee scheme with the higher Sharpe ratio. The greater
the difference between the Sharpe ratios of the two stand-alone fee structures Y1 and Y2,
the lower the threshold H, and consequently the lower the correlation required to prompt
investors to put some money in the fee structure with the lower Sharpe ratio. Since Y1 and
Y2 are both increasing piecewise linear functions of the same random variable X
x
T , they
will tend to be highly correlated, and for most parameter sets we would expect ρ > H,
and full investment in the fee structure with the highest Sharpe ratio.
The above discussion indicates a Catch-22 of seeking diversification in fee structures,
due to the typically high correlation between Y1 and Y2. Either the threshold H is low, in
which case it is likely that investing all wealth in one or other fee structure is optimal, or
H is high, in which case the Sharpe ratios of the two fee structures are very close, and the
improvement due to diversification (if it exists) is small.
Real-world hedge fund return distributions are often asymmetric, with fat tails. The
Sharpe-ratio, which is based on the use of variance as a measure of risk, may be misleading
when used for such distributions. Consequently, we also consider the maximization of the





where l is the minimal acceptable return and σ2d := E[min{r(T )− l, 0}2]7 is called the lower
partial moment of r(T ).
4.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we present numerical results analyzing the optimal fee structure for hedge
fund investors in terms of maximizing both the Sharpe Ratio and the Sortino Ratio, dis-
cussing the limited potential extent and impact of “fee diversification.”
6Explicit mathematical expressions for µ̃1, µ̃2, σ̃1, σ̃2 and σ̃12 can be found in Appendix C, equations
(C.18) to (C.22).
7A detailed mathematical derivation for σ2d is provided in the Appendix C.
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0 = x, (4.9)
where µ > 0 is the annual growth rate, σ > 0 is the annual volatility, Wt is a standard
Brownian Motion, and the management fees for traditional fee structure and first-loss fee
structure are equal. i.e. m = m1 = m2.
It should be noted that in all the examples in this chapter we assume that the param-
eters of the processes are known with certainty. This is obviously not the case in the real
world (indeed, in practice we do not even know the process driving the returns). In prac-
tical applications, the added uncertainty due to the need to estimate the parameters (and
the structure of the process driving returns) must be taken into consideration. In particu-
lar, the drift parameter µ, which has a significant impact on the preferred fee structure, is
notoriously difficult to estimate in practice (see, e.g. Merton (1980)).
In Figures 4.2 and 4.3, we fix the six parameters µ, σ, T,m, c, r and let the remaining
parameters α1 and α2 (the performance fee rates for the traditional and first-loss fee struc-
tures respectively) vary in their reasonable ranges. For each valid point (α1, α2), we check
condition (4.5) and color the point black if the condition is satisfied. The black regions in-
dicate that there exists a portfolio with non-zero allocation to both fee structures ω which
achieves the optimal Sharpe Ratio (an ‘interior maximum’). In the white regions, there is
no interior maximum, and the optimal allocation is 100% in one fee structure or the other
(in the area above the black region the traditional fee structure is preferred, while below
the black region the first-loss fee structure is preferred). We see that the black regions for
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 are very narrow, implying that in most cases there is no benefit due to
‘fee diversification’; either the traditional fee structure or the first-loss fee structure makes
the investor achieve the optimal Sharpe Ratio when α1 and α2 are changing. The first-loss
fee structure appears to be preferred for the bulk of the performance fee combinations that
we consider (i.e. the area below the black region is larger than the area above the black
region). The black region follows a nearly linear path for all combinations of (µ, σ) that
we considered. Looking at the different graphs, we see that the traditional fee structure is
preferable (requires a lower performance fee to be the structure selected) when the underly-
ing hedge fund assets have higher expected returns, and lower volatilities, with the impact
of low volatilities being particularly pronounced. This is intuitive, as with higher means
and lower volatilities, the put-option-like downside protection provided to the investor in
the first-loss structure is less likely to be exercised (and will tend to pay off less when it is
exercised).
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Figure 4.2: Sharpe Ratio Contour Plots: The two axes are α1 and α2, the performance fees
of the traditional fee structure and the first-loss fee structure. The black region indicates
that the condition (4.5) for an interior maximum is satisfied. The remaining parameter
values are fixed at x = 1, σ = 0.1, T = 1, m = 0.01, c = 0.1, r = 0.02, and µ =
0.06, 0.08, 0.1, 0.12.
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Figure 4.3: Sharpe Ratio Contour Plots: The two axes are α1 and α2, the performance fees
of the traditional fee structure and the first-loss fee structure. The black region indicates
that the condition (4.5) for an interior maximum is satisfied. The remaining parameter
values are fixed at x = 1, µ = 0.08, T = 1, m = 0.01, c = 0.1, r = 0.02, and σ =
0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2.
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Figure 4.4: Sharpe Ratio vs the proportion the investor puts in the traditional fee struc-
ture fund, ω1. The solid, dotted, and dashed lines are the cases µ = 0.2, 0.25, and 0.3
respectively. The remaining parameter values are chosen as: x = 1, σ = 0.05, T = 1,m =
0.01, c = 0.1, and r = 0.02.
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Figure 4.5: Sharpe Ratio vs the proportion the investor puts in the traditional fee structure
fund, ω1. The solid, dotted, and dashed lines are the cases σ = 0.15, 0.175, and 0.2
respectively. The remaining parameter values are chosen as: x = 1, µ = 0.05, T = 1,m =
0.01, c = 0.1, and r = 0.02. Note that when σ ≈ 0.205, α∗2 ≈ 0.5.
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Figure 4.6: Sharpe Ratio vs the proportion the investor puts in the traditional fee struc-
ture fund, ω1. The solid, dotted, and dashed lines are the cases c = 0.05, 0.1, and 0.15
respectively. The remaining parameter values are chosen as: x = 1, µ = 0.08, σ = 0.1, T =
1,m = 0.01, c = 0.1, and r = 0.02.
Next, we fix α1 = 0.2 and α2 = 0.5 (typical market values) and consider all possible
portfolios (ω1, ω2) for different values of the parameters µ, σ, and c. In particular, we
consider funds with high expected return and low volatility, low expected return and high
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volatility, and different deposit amounts, for which results are given in Figures 4.4, 4.5,
and 4.6 respectively. The results in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 are rather intuitive, and
reinforce the observations made above. As high expected return and low volatility indicate
the hedge fund is more likely to make a profit, and the downside protection afforded by
the first-loss structure will not be relevant, the investor will favour the fee structure with
the lower performance fee (the classical fee structure). However, we notice that the Sharpe
Ratio curves in Exhibit 4.4, corresponding to a low volatility regime, are rather flat; while
the classical fee structure is preferred, there is not much significant difference between the
two fee structures in terms of Sharpe Ratio. On the other hand, low expected return and
high volatility make the fund have a higher chance of suffering a loss, leading the investor
to prefer the the first-loss fee structure. Although Exhibit 4.5 presents steeper curves, the
Sharpe Ratios are very close to zero. Finally, Exhibit 4.6 indicates that the first-loss fee
structure is more heavily favoured by investors when the deposit amount increases. This
is entirely intuitive; the greater the protection against losses offered, the more appealing
the first-loss fee structure appears.
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 present detailed results on the nature of the investor’s optimal fee
structure for different values of µ and σ. In Exhibit 4.7, α2 = 0.4, while in Exhibit 4.8,
α2 = 0.5. The results demonstrate that the investor will always choose the traditional fee
structure given the hedge fund expected return is high enough. The significance of the
downside protection effect of the first-loss fee structure diminishes as the expected return
increases. Essentially, fee structures with lower performance fees result in higher Sharpe
Ratios. Furthermore, we see that, in contrast to what we observed earlier, the classical fee
structure is preferred for extremely high levels of volatility. As noted before, when volatil-
ity increases, both the probability that the guarantee will be triggered increases, and the
expected payoff given a loss is larger. However, when volatility is very high, the possibility
of an extremely high payoff in the classical structure (under which the investor keeps a
greater share of the profits compared to the first-loss structure) outweighs the higher ex-
pected payoff of the insurance. Very low expected returns can also produce negative Sharpe
ratios, for which our Sharpe ratio maximization framework is not appropriate. Comparing
the two figures, we observe the unsurprising result that the classical fee structure is pre-
ferred more often when α2 (the manager’s participation rate in the first-loss structure) is
higher.
Finally, we let Smax denote the optimal Sharpe Ratio and Smin denote the lowest
possible Sharpe Ratio for the investor. In Figures 4.9 and 4.10, we plot the ratios of
Smax to Smin for some parameter values for which there exists an interior optimal point.
Note that the lowest Sharpe Ratio is always attained on one of the boundary points, i.e.
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either the traditional fee structure or the first-loss fee structure admits the lowest Sharpe
Ratio. For all the cases (σ = 0.1, σ = 0.15 and σ = 0.2), the ratio plots exhibit valley-like
behaviours. The reason is that the ratios of Smax to SR1 decrease as the ratios of Smax to
SR2 increase when µ increases. In other words, the decreasing parts of the graphs are cases
when the traditional fee structure admits lowest Sharpe ratio. And when µ is high enough,
the first-loss fee structure admits the lowest Sharpe Ratio so that the graphs increase
again. Generally, we find that the optimal Sharpe Ratio is not significantly larger than the
worst Sharpe Ratio of these two fee structures. In fact, the largest ratio of Smax to Smin
is only around 1.006 when µ ≈ 0.15 and σ = 0.1, indicating very little benefit from “fee
diversification.” This makes sense in light of our theoretical results. Since ρ = corr(Y1, Y2)





we must have SR1 ≈ SR2, i.e. the Sharpe ratios of the two fee structures must be nearly



















Figure 4.7: Sharpe Ratio Contour Plots: The two axes are µ and σ, the hedge fund expected
return and volatility. We set the performance fees α1 = 20% and α2 = 40%. In the white
regions, both the first-loss and traditional fee structures have negative Sharpe ratios. The
dark grey region indicates that the investor favours the first-loss fee structure. The light
grey regions indicate that the investor favours the traditional fee structure. The black
region indicates that there exists a non-trivial asset allocation. The remaining parameter



















Figure 4.8: Sharpe Ratio Contour Plots: The two axes are µ and σ, the hedge fund expected
return and volatility. We set the performance fees α1 = 20% and α2 = 50%. In the white
regions, both the first-loss and traditional fee structures have negative Sharpe ratios. The
dark grey region indicates that the investor favours the first-loss fee structure. The light
grey regions indicate that the investor favours the traditional fee structure. The black
region indicates that there exists a non-trivial asset allocation. The remaining parameter
values are chosen as: x = 1, T = 1,m = 0.01, c = 0.1, and r = 0.02.
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Figure 4.9: Ratio Smax/Smin vs Return (µ): We set the performance fees α1 = 20% and
α2 = 40%. The solid, dotted, and dashed lines represent the ratios when σ = 0.1, 0.15,
and 0.2 repectively. The remaining parameter values are chosen as: x = 1, T = 1,m =
0.01, c = 0.1, and r = 0.02.
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Figure 4.10: Ratio Smax/Smin vs Return (µ): We set the performance fees α1 = 20% and
α2 = 50%. The solid, dotted, and dashed lines represent the ratios when σ = 0.1, 0.15,
and 0.2 repectively. The remaining parameter values are chosen as: x = 1, T = 1,m =
0.01, c = 0.1, and r = 0.02.
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Next, we consider the results of maximizing the Sortino ratio. Figures 4.11 and 4.12
present detailed results on the nature of the investor’s optimal fee structure for different
values of µ and σ, with α2 = 0.4 and α2 = 0.5 respectively. The results here again admit
an intuitive interpretation. Fixing a level of return µ > 0, consider beginning at σ = 0,
and then increasing the volatility. For zero or very low volatility, the positive mean return
will dominate, and the insurance component of the first-loss structure will almost never
be triggered. As a result, the classical fee structure will be preferred as the one in which
investors keep a larger percentage of the gains, since α1 < α2. As volatility increases, so
do both the probability that the insurance portion of the first-loss structure will come into
effect, and the expected size of the protected losses given that losses occur. Hence, the
first-loss fee structure becomes more appealing. There is a brief transition period of limited
“fee diversification” before investing all the funds in the first-loss fee structure becomes
optimal. As the volatility increases still further, the expected benefit of the insurance
component is limited (the downside protection is capped), and the potential for very large
upside gains (due to extremely high volatility) becomes increasingly important. Since
investors in the classical fee structure keep a higher percentage of these extreme gains, for
very high levels of the volatility, the classical fee structure is preferred. Again, there is a
small black transition region, in which limited “fee diversification” exists.
To assess the potential for diversification benefits when performance is measured using
the Sortino ratio rather than the Sharpe ratio, we plot the ratios of the maximal Sortino
ratio (SORmax) to the minimal Sortino ratio (SORmin) in Figures 4.13 and 4.14 for cases in
which there exists an interior optimal point. Similar to Figures 4.9 and 4.10, the decreasing
and increasing parts of the graphs are where the traditional fee structure and first-loss fee
structure attain SORmin respectively. The benefits from diversification for the Sortino
ratio, while still confined to a subset of the possible parameter values, are more significant
than in the case of the Sharpe ratio, and this effect is larger at higher levels of volatility.
Again, considering a fixed µ, and increasing σ, we see the case when volatilities are high and
diversification is possible corresponds to the black region transitioning between exclusive
investment in the first-loss fee structure (the dark grey region in Figures 4.11 and 4.12) and
the high volatility region when exclusive investment in the classical fee structure is optimal
(the upper light grey region). The scope for diversification here is more pronounced because
as we move into the classical structure, we are only being penalized in the Sortino ratio
for its downside performance (rather than its variance, which is affected by the potential






















Figure 4.11: Sortino Ratio Contour Plots: The two axes are µ and σ, the hedge fund
expected return and volatility. We set the performance fees α1 = 20% and α2 = 40%.
The dark grey region indicates that the investor favours the first-loss fee structure. The
light grey regions indicate that the investor favours the traditional fee structure. The black
regions indicate that there exists a non-trivial asset allocation. The remaining parameter






















Figure 4.12: Sortino Ratio Contour Plots: The two axes are µ and σ, the hedge fund
expected return and volatility. We set the performance fees α1 = 20% and α2 = 50%.
The dark grey region indicates that the investor favours the first-loss fee structure. The
light grey regions indicate that the investor favours the traditional fee structure. The black
regions indicate that there exists a non-trivial asset allocation. The remaining parameter
values are chosen as: x = 1, T = 1,m = 0.01, c = 0.1, r = 0.02, and l = r.
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Figure 4.13: Sortino Ratio vs Return(µ). The solid, dotted, and dashed lines are the
cases σ = 0.05, 0.075, and 0.1 respectively. The remaining parameter values are chosen as:
x = 1, T = 1,m = 0.01, c = 0.1, r = 0.02, and l = r.
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Figure 4.14: Sortino Ratio vs Return(µ). The solid, dotted, and dashed lines are the
cases σ = 0.05, 0.075, and 0.1 respectively. The remaining parameter values are chosen as:
x = 1, T = 1,m = 0.01, c = 0.1 ,r = 0.02, and l = r.
Figures 4.15 and 4.16 present detailed results on the nature of the investor’s optimal
fee structure for different values of µ and σ, with α1 = 0.2, and α2 set so that a risk-neutral
investor is indifferent between the first-loss and classical fee structures.8 The traditional
8Details are provided in Appendix C.
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fee structure is preferred for various choices of (µ, σ). The reason is that the performance
fee α2 needs to be extremely high (≈ 75%) in order for the first-loss fee structure to have
the same risk-neutral value as the traditional fee structure (a similar observation can be
found in Djerroud et al. (2016)). Hence, the downside protection effect of the first-loss fee
structure is offset by the high performance fee. Furthermore, the interest rate does not
seem to have a significant impact on the results, as Figures 4.15 and 4.16 illustrate with


















Figure 4.15: Sharpe Ratio Contour Plots: The two axes are µ and σ, the hedge fund
expected return and volatility. We set the performance fee α1 = 20%, α2 so that the risk-
neutral values of the two fee structures are equal. In the white regions, both the first-loss
and traditional fee structures have negative Sharpe ratios. The light grey regions indicate
that the investor favours the traditional fee structure. The remaining parameter values are


















Figure 4.16: Sharpe Ratio Contour Plots: The two axes are µ and σ, the hedge fund
expected return and volatility. We set the performance fee α1 = 20%, and α2 so that
the risk-neutral values of the two fee structures are equal. In the white regions, both the
first-loss and traditional fee structures have negative Sharpe ratios. The light grey regions
indicate that the investor favours the traditional fee structure. The remaining parameter
values are chosen as: x = 1, T = 1,m = 0.01, c = 0.1, and r = 0.05.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study and compare the Sharpe Ratios and Sortino Ratios of hedge fund
investors facing combinations of the first-loss fee structure and traditional fee structure.
In particular, we maximize the Sharpe Ratio or the Sortino Ratio of a portfolio that
combines payoffs of the two fee structures at maturity T . A criterion (4.5) is presented
to distinguish whether or not there exists an interior optimal weight allocation between
the two fee structures for the Sharpe Ratio. Numerical examples are presented for both
the Sharpe and Sortino Ratios, assuming a geometric Brownian motion process for the
hedge fund assets. In most cases we find that the optimal weights are on the boundary
points, indicating that one extreme fee structure is preferred compared to the other, and all
possible mixtures. Typically, the classical fee structure is preferred at very low volatilities,
where the insurance in the first-loss contract is unlikely to be triggered, and at extremely
high volatilities, for which the share of a very large potential upside is important. At
intermediate volatilities (often covering most of the range typically seen in practice), the
first-loss structure is preferred, owing to the importance of its insurance component. We
find that there is negligible benefit to the investor due to “fee diversification,” even in the
case when a combination of fee structures is optimal.
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Chapter 5
Valuation and Risk Analysis for
Returns in Hedge Funds with
Negative Fee Structures
5.1 Introduction
According to FitchRatings, the total of sovereign debt with negative yields increased to
$11.7 trillion as of June 27, 2016, up $1.3 trillion from the total at the end of May.1
Major institutional investors have approximately 30% to 50% of their assets allocated to
fixed income, which makes them increasingly vulnerable to the interest rate environment
(OECD (2016)). The low-rate environment has also impacted the manner in which hedge
fund managers are compensated since the investment opportunity set for hedge funds has
shrunk in general. Moreover, investors accept paying the traditional fees to hedge fund
managers only if the underlying trading strategy generates superior returns (or alpha).
However, the lukewarm performance of hedge funds in recent years has pressured the fees
as investors need to maintain an acceptable share of gross returns to meet their investment
thresholds. Hedge funds often pursue trading strategies that involve significant short po-
sitions in securities. These short positions are typically implemented through reverse repo
transactions, in which the hedge fund purchases a security from a counterparty today (and
resells it in the market), and commits to sell the security back to the counterparty (after
buying it back in the market, hopefully at a lower price) at a specified future date and
fixed (higher) future price. The difference in the price paid to the counterparty today for
1https://www.fitchratings.com/site/pr/1008156
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the security, and the price received for it in the future is referred to as the “short rebate,”
and represents the interest component of the transaction (from the counterparty’s point
of view, the transaction is a repo agreement, which is essentially a loan collateralized by
the securities). In addition to depressing returns on fixed-income assets, the low-rate en-
vironment has significantly trimmed the short rebates that managers used to receive on
their short book resulting in lower performance of trading strategies in general. This has
further undermined the acceptability of traditional 2&20 fee structures (see Lorin (2017))
and has encouraged investors to seek innovative fee methodologies.
Investors’ demand for yield, combined with the difficult market environment and the
challenges faced by many hedge fund managers in raising assets, has led institutional in-
vestors and fund managers to embrace new fee structures featuring an element of downside
protection. In these fee structures, commonly referred to as ‘first-loss’ or ‘shared-loss’
structures, the fund manager insures a portion of the investor’s losses.
In this chapter, we extend the concept of first-loss fee structures by considering a guar-
antee not just against losses but providing a minimum return guarantee from the manager
to the investor. In this regard, the investment starts to look to the investor like a bond
with a coupon payment that contains two parts: a fixed component, coming from the re-
turn guarantee offered by the hedge fund, and a variable one, arising from the performance
of the hedge fund investment net of performance fees. Figure 5.1 illustrates a spectrum
of fee structures from the traditional to the first-loss family of structures and beyond. In
the traditional ‘2&20’ structure, the investor’s return varies with the performance of the
hedge fund strategy; the investor can experience periods of losses as seen in the leftmost
bar in the figure. A simple first-loss structure involves a higher share of the strategy per-
formance allocated to the manager in return for downside protection for the investor. The
investor will be less likely to experience periods of losses under this structure; however,
the investor return could be zero. A first variant of the first-loss fee structure is the one in
which the investor requires a minimum return coupled with a smaller share of the strategy
performance in exchange for a higher performance fee paid to the manager. The rightmost
bar illustrates a first-loss structure in which the investor ‘swaps’ the performance of the
strategy on its capital for a promised fixed ‘coupon’. These last two fee structures both
provide bond-like payment, which are achieved by a management fee waiver (Rosenbaum
(2019)). When the waived amount exceeds the management fee charged, a negative fee, in
other words, a cash rebate is provided to the investor. In fact, the SEC (U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission) approved such a fee structure for an ETF (exchange-traded
fund) in May 2019 (Walker (2019)) for the first time in history. Hence, we refer the two last
structures as ‘negative fee structures.’ From left to right in Figure 5.1, the upside to the
investor is gradually reduced in exchange for downside protection, provided by the fund
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manager. In addition, the investor is more certain to receive a higher minimum return or a
larger ‘coupon.’ It should be noted that the performance fees on the horizontal axis are for
illustration purposes only, and the size of the fixed coupon is dependent on the underlying
strategy.
Figure 5.1: Schematic representation of hedge fund fee structures from traditional to first-
loss fee structures.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The second section discusses
hedge fund fee structures. The third section analyzes negative fee structures from an
option pricing perspective under a regime-switching model using risk-neutral valuation.
The fourth section analyzes the risks of the investor’s returns under a negative fee structure,
now using the real-world measure. The fifth section concludes.
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5.2 Hedge Fund Fee Structures: From Traditional Fee
Structures to Negative Fees
5.2.1 Traditional Fee Structures
Traditionally, a hedge fund manager charges two types of fees to the fund’s investors:
 A fixed management fee, usually ranging from 1% to 2% of the fund’s net asset value.
 A performance fee, most commonly equal to 20% of net profits obtained by the fund.
In this chapter we assume a single investor and a single share issued by the fund.
The extension to the case of multiple investors and multiple shares is straightforward.
Although fees are paid according to a determined schedule (usually monthly or quarterly
for management fees and annually for performance fees) we will assume a single payment
at the end of a fixed term T .
The initial fund supplied by the investor is denoted by X0. The hedge fund manager
then invests the fund assets to create the future gross values Xt, for t > 0. The gross fund
value Xt is split between the investor’s share It (the net asset value) and the manager’s fee
Mt:
Xt = It +Mt.
At time 0, I0 = X0 and M0 = 0.
There are countless variations on the basic framework, including hurdles, clawbacks,
etc. (for more details on first-loss arrangements, see the previous chapters, or Banzaca
(2012)). We will ignore these and assume the commonly used version of a management
fee equal to m · X0 (m represents a fixed percentage of the initial investment), and a
performance fee of α · (XT − (1 +m)X0))+ , so that the performance fee is payable only
when the investor’s return is positive, and is zero when it is negative. Hence, the manager’s
payoff due to fees is:
MT = m ·X0 + α · (XT − (1 +m)X0)+ .
In other words, while the management fee is a fixed future liability to the investor, the
performance fee is a contingent claim on the part of the manager. As a consequence, we
will be pricing the management fee simply as a fixed guaranteed fee with a predetermined
future cash value, and we will be valuing the performance fee as the value of a certain call
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option. In our setting, we will assume a regime-switching process for the invested assets Xt,
which allows us to value the performance fee using known results. It is worth mentioning
that hedge fund managers can speculate on volatility, credit risks, etc. and in contrast
to traditional money managers, they can go long and short. The diversity in investment
styles and the different levels of gross and net exposure that they can employ often result
in leptokurtic returns, for example through the potential for large negative returns in the
left tail of the return distribution. A regime-switching process including a ‘stress regime’
with high volatility can reproduce these properties of hedge fund returns. Generalization of
the current framework to other models of hedge fund returns, for example using stochastic
volatility by employing generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH)
models, could be a subject for future research.
From a business perspective, it is important to note that the investor has a say in the
fees paid to the fund manager: sometimes, as in the case of managed account investments,
through a direct negotiation of the fees, at other times, such as in a normal fund structure,
through the right not to invest in the fund in the first place. However, when it comes to
the choice of the portfolio, the manager has full discretion, within the limits existing in the
offering memorandum, without seeking investors’ permission or input. This consideration
will play a role if one tries to extrapolate the results of this chapter to real investment
situations.
5.2.2 From First-Loss to Negative Fee Structures
While the first-loss fee structure protects investors from downside moves in the market, if
the manager does not generate returns the investor does not make any profits. A negative
fee structure results from modifying the first-loss structure to provide a fixed level of
promised return to investors, while maintaining some level of downside protection. The
cost of this bond-like return for investors is the increase of the performance fee paid to
the manager; we refer to this framework as the ‘high-yield bond like’ framework. In the
limit, the investor has a guaranteed return and pays 100% of the performance beyond the
guarantee to the manager. As such, the return profile provided to the investor resembles
that of an investor in an asset-backed security, with the underlying portfolio being the
assets of the hedge fund; we refer to this framework as the ‘swap’ framework. In the swap
framework, at the end of each period, all returns generated by the strategy are allocated
to the investor up to the ‘return hurdle’ which is negotiated with the hedge fund manager.
The remaining returns above the return hurdle are fully allocated to the manager as a
performance fee. If the fund return is less than the return hurdle, the manager’s deposit
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is used to make up the difference. In subsequent periods, profits are first used to replenish
the manager’s deposit, before either the investor’s return or the performance fee is paid.
A close look at the negative fee structure reveals that the positions of the investor
and the hedge fund manager can be formulated as portfolios of options. The first-loss fee
structure was analyzed from an option-pricing perspective using the Black–Scholes model
in Djerroud et al. (2016). In the next section, we extend that analysis to the negative
fee structure under a regime-switching model. Given the bond-like payoff of the negative
fee structure, this setting is very similar to the classical Merton model for credit risk
(see Merton (1974)), with the difference coming from the additional downside protection
provided to investors by the hedge fund manager.
Denoting the return threshold by H, the payoff functions of the investor and the man-
ager at the terminal time T are respectively:
IT =
{
X0(1 +H) when (XT −HX0) ≥ (1− c)X0,




XT −X0(1 +H) when (XT −H X0) ≥ (1− c)X0,
−cX0 when (XT −H X0) < (1− c)X0.
Writing these payoff functions more compactly, we obtain:
IT = X0(1 +H)− ((1− c)X0 −XT +H X0)+,
MT = XT −X0(1 +H) + ((1− c)X0 −XT +H X0)+. (5.2)
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Negative First−Loss Fee Structure
Manager's Initial Investment
(b)
Figure 5.2: Investor’s and manager’s payoff: Figure (a) and Figure (b) are the investor’s
and manager’s payoff respectively with parameters: X0 = 1, c = 0.1 and H = 0.04.
From the above formulas, we see that the investor (manager) has a short (long) position
in a put option on the fund assets, with strike price (1−c)X0+H X0. Risk-neutral valuation
can be applied to derive the price of the positions.2
In particular, the value of the investor’s position is:
VI(0) = exp(−rT )X0(1 +H)− P (X0, T, (1− c)X0 +H X0, r),
where P (X,T,K, r) is the price of a put option on a non-dividend paying asset with current
value of the underlying X, time to expiration T , strike price K, and where the risk-free
interest rate is r. The above framework can be easily extended to the case in which the
investor receives a portion of the excess return above the return threshold H.
2It should be noted that, similarly to Merton (1974), some of the assumptions used to justify arbitrage-
free pricing methods do not hold in practice in the context in which we are applying the model here. In
particular, it is typically not possible for the investor to trade in (or even directly observe) the hedge fund
assets Xt.
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5.3 Pricing the Payoffs
We assume a regime-switching model, in which the coefficients of a diffusion process for the
value of the hedge fund assets themselves follow continuous-time Markov chains. Regime-
switching models have found many applications in finance since the seminal work of Hamil-
ton (1989). They are able to reproduce many features of real-world return distributions,
including skewness, volatility clustering, and fat tails. For applications of regime-switching
models to insurance products with investment guarantees, similar in sprit to the hedge-
fund guarantees considered in this paper, see Hardy (2003). For many other financial
applications, see the papers in the volumes Mamon and Elliott (2007), and Zeng and Wu
(2013).
We assume the regime is governed by a finite state continuous-time Markov chain ε(t)
with state space S = {1, 2}, where state 1 represents the ‘normal’ regime and state 2







where λ1 and λ2 are the transition rates of leaving states 1 and 2 respectively. The value of
the hedge fund assets Xt follows a geometric Brownian motion, except that the coefficients
of Xt change with the regime:
dXt = µε(t)Xtdt+ σε(t)XtdZt
where Zt is a standard Brownian motion, independent of ε(t), and µε(t) and σε(t) are con-
stants in each state. For simplicity, when ε(t) = 1, 2, we use µ1, µ2 and σ1, σ2 to denote
the growth rates and volatilities in each regime. Finally, the risk-free asset B satisfies
Bt = e
rt. The value of the investor’s position can be determined using an expectation
under a risk-neutral measure (see Elliott et al. (2005)) to be:
V iI = EQ[I(T )|ε(0) = i]. (5.3)
Then, we have
V iI = exp (−rT )X0(1 +H)− Pi(X0, T, (1− c)X0 +H X0, r), (5.4)
where Pi(X,T,K, r) = EQ[e−rT (K − ST )+|ε(0) = i], i = 1, 2 is the European put option
price under the Markov-modulated geometric Brownian motion model. Moreover, from
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Guo (2001) and Fuh et al. (2012), we obtain:








φ(ln(K − y),m(t), v(t)fi(t, T )dtdy (5.5)
where:
m(t) = ln(X) + (rT − 1
2
v(t)),
v(t) = (σ21 − σ22)t+ σ21T,
f1(t, T ) = e





f2(t, T ) = e






where φ(x,m(t), v(t)) is the normal density function with mean m(t) and variance v(t), I0







k!Γ(k + a+ 1)
, (5.6)
and δ0 is a delta function with a mass at 0.
Figures 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 illustrate the sensitivity of the value of the investor’s payoff
to the model parameters. Figure 5.3 is generated assuming that the market is initially in
the normal state (ε(0) = 1). Figure 5.4 repeats the analysis assuming that the market is
initially in the stressed state (ε(0) = 2). Finally, Figure 5.5 assumes that ε(0) is random,
generated according to the stationary distribution of the Markov chain ε(t), i.e., ε(0) = 1
with probability π1 = λ2/(λ1 + λ2), and ε(0) = 2 with probability π2 = 1 − π1. The
parameters are set to T = 1
12
(the investment horizon is one month), c = 10%3 (the
manager deposit), r = 1% (annual risk-free interest rate), X0 = $1 (the initial investment),
and H = 4% (annual return threshold). The volatility and transition rate in a normal
market are σ1 = 10% and λ1 = 1, while the corresponding parameters in a stressed market
are σ2 = 20% and λ2 = 12.
3We adapt the value c = 10% from first-loss fee structure in Chapter 4.
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Figure 5.3: Sensitivity of the value of the investor’s payoff to various parameters, given
that the market is initially in the normal state (ε(0) = 1). Benchmark parameter values
are T = 1
12
(the investment horizon is one month), c = 10% (the manager deposit), r = 1%
(annual risk-free interest rate), σ1 = 10% (the annual volatility in a normal market),
σ2 = 20% (the annual volatility in a stressed market), λ1 = 1 (the transition rate in a
normal market), λ2 = 12 (the transition rate in a stressed market), X0 = 1 (the initial
investment), and H = 4% (the annual return threshold).
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Figure 5.4: Sensitivity of the value of the investor’s payoff to various parameters, given
that the market is initially in the stressed state (ε(0) = 2). Benchmark parameter values
are T = 1
12
(the investment horizon is one month), c = 10% (the manager deposit), r = 1%
(annual risk-free interest rate), σ1 = 10% (the annual volatility in a normal market),
σ2 = 20% (the annual volatility in a stressed market), λ1 = 1 (the transition rate in a
normal market), λ2 = 12 (the transition rate in a stressed market), X0 = 1 (the initial
investment), and H = 4% (the annual return threshold).
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Figure 5.5: Sensitivity of the value of the investor’s payoff to various parameters, given
that ε(0) is chosen randomly from its stationary distribution. Benchmark parameter values
are T = 1
12
(the investment horizon is one month), c = 10% (the manager deposit), r = 1%
(annual risk-free interest rate), σ1 = 10% (the annual volatility in a normal market),
σ2 = 20% (the annual volatility in a stressed market), λ1 = 1 (the transition rate in a
normal market), λ2 = 12 (the transition rate in a stressed market), X0 = 1 (the initial
investment), and H = 4% (the annual return threshold).
The same basic patterns emerge when looking at the three sets of figures. The volatility
sub-figures show that the value of the investor’s position is generally a decreasing function
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of the volatility parameters of the underlying fund. As the volatility becomes very large,
the value of the investor’s position starts to decline steeply as the hedge fund’s put option
(in which the investor has a short position) becomes more valuable. However, the scales
on the y-axes are extremely narrow, which indicates very limited sensitivity. The deposit
sub-figures (varying c) illustrate that, as expected, the value of the investor’s position
is an increasing function of the deposit level. The return threshold sub-figures show the
intuitive monotonic relationship between the value of the investor’s position and the return
threshold. The value of the investor’s position is also a decreasing function of the risk-free
rate r, in accord with the bond-like nature of the investor’s payoff.
The value of the investor’s payoff is lower in a stressed market than in a normal market.
The stressed market starts with a higher volatility (σ2 > σ1), thus increasing the value of
the put option in which the investor has a short position. It is further important to note that
given the short time horizon (T = 1/12), there is a significant probability that the market
will remain in the high volatility, stressed regime over the entire life of the contract. For
longer-lived contracts, the discrepancy between the investor’s values given that the market
is in either the stressed or normal state will be less pronounced. Finally, we note that the
figures for when the initial market state is random with distribution equal to the stationary
distribution of ε(t) are close to those for when the market is started in the normal state.
This is due to the fact that with our benchmark parameters the stationary distribution
assigns a high probability to the market being in a normal state (π1 = 12/13 ≈ 92.3%),
as is common in financial applications of regime-switching models (see the references cited
above).
For each figure, one can look for the point where the curve crosses the value 1.0 (if it
exists). This allows us to identify the parameter values for which the contract (in terms
of risk-neutral valuation in the regime-switching model) favours either the investor or the
manager. Parameter values for which the curve is above 1.0 show that the contract favours
the investor, while for parameter values where the curve is below 1.0 the contract favours
the manager. The point at which the curve crosses 1.0 is the break-even, or indifference,
point.
5.4 Risk Analysis of the Investor’s Position as a Bond
As noted above, the position of the investor is analogous to a bond, with a promised
return of H (received if the hedge fund assets perform sufficiently well). In the event of
default, there is a random amount of recovery (again determined by the level of the hedge
fund assets). In this section, we examine the properties of the investor’s payoff from the
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perspective of this analogy with a fixed income investment. In particular, we compute
default probabilities and expected recovery rates.
In this section, we consider the manager’s and investor’s expected payoffs under the
real world measure. In order to obtain numerical results, one can discretize the Markov-
modulated geometric Brownian motion process as follows:






− 1 = µε̃(t)∆t+ σε̃(t)
√
∆t · ηt
where the ηt are i.i.d. standard normal random variables, and ε̃(t) is a discretized version







where p1,2 is the probability of transitioning from state 1 to state 2, and p2,1 is the proba-
bility of transitioning from state 2 to state 1. The stationary distribution for this Markov
chain is π0 = p2,1(p1,2 + p2,1)
−1, π1 = p1,2(p1,2 + p2,1)
−1.
We simulated 5000 scenarios of the returns of the hedge fund using the above model
with an annual time horizon and daily time steps. Recall that the payoffs to the hedge
fund manager (M̃) and investor (Ĩ) for the traditional fee structure are:
M̃(T ) =
{
α(XT −X0), XT ≥ X0,
0, XT < X0,
Ĩ(T ) =
{
X0 + (1− α)(XT −X0), XT ≥ X0,
XT , XT < X0,
and the payoffs for the negative loss structure are:
M(T ) =
{
XT −X0(1 +H), XT ≥ (1− c+H)X0,
−cX0, XT < (1− c+H)X0,
I(T ) =
{
X0(1 +H), XT ≥ (1− c+H)X0,
XT + cX0, XT < (1− c+H)X0.
Table 5.1 presents simulated expected returns and standard deviations (with standard
errors of the estimates in parentheses) for both the traditional fee structure and the negative
fee structure. The volatility in normal markets is set to σ1 = 0.1, while in stressed markets
it is σ2 = 0.2. We consider two different possible growth rates for each state, µ1 =
0.1, 0.15 and µ2 = −0.05, 0.0. The probability p1,2 is set to 0.01, while p2,1 is set to
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)T . In this section, we assume that the initial state of the Markov chain is 1 (normal
market). We see that for investors, expected payoffs are slightly higher for the traditional
fee structure, but standard deviations are also significantly higher in this case. This is
consistent with the analogy that the negative fee structure more closely resembles a fixed
income investment, while the traditional fee structure gives a more ‘equity-like’ payoff.
In contrast, the manager’s expected payoff and standard deviation are higher under the
negative fee structure, and lower under the traditional fee structure. As is to be anticipated,
expected payoffs are larger when the growth parameters are larger; the standard deviations
of payoffs do not change significantly when the µi’s are varied.
Table 5.1: Expected payoffs (and standard errors in parentheses) for the traditional fee
structure and negative fee structure. X0 = 1, T = 1, α = 20%, p1,2 = 0.01, p2,1 = 0.05, σ1 =
0.1, σ2 = 0.2, Nsim = 5000, H = 0.04, and c = 0.1.
(µ0, µ1) EP[M̃(T )] EP[Ĩ(T )] EP[M(T )] EP[I(T )]
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = −0.05 0.0209 (0.0003) 1.0641 (0.0016) 0.0526(0.0017) 1.0323(0.0003)
µ0 = 0.15, µ1 = −0.05 0.0296 (0.0004) 1.1077 (0.0017) 0.097 (0.0019) 1.036 (0.0003)
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = 0 0.0218 (0.0003) 1.069 (0.0016) 0.063 (0.0017) 1.034 (0.0003)
µ0 = 0.15, µ1 = 0 0.0308 (0.0003) 1.1142 (0.0016) 0.1081 (0.0019) 1.0369(0.0002)
S.D. of M̃(T ) S.D. of Ĩ(T ) S.D. of M(T ) S.D. of I(T )
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = −0.05 0.0215 (0.0003) 0.1121 (0.0013) 0.1202 (0.0013) 0.0269 (0.0009)
µ0 = 0.15, µ1 = −0.05 0.0251 (0.0003) 0.1167 (0.0012) 0.1345 (0.0014) 0.0178 (0.0008)
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = 0 0.0218 (0.0002) 0.1118 (0.0011) 0.1216 (0.0012) 0.0244(0.0009)
µ0 = 0.15, µ1 = 0 0.0247 (0.0003) 0.1131 (0.0012) 0.1312 (0.0013) 0.0169(0.0009)
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 repeat the analysis with p1,2 = 0.1, p2,1 = 0.05, and p1,2 = 0.01, p2,1 =
0.1 respectively. Comparing to the figures in Table 5.1, Table 5.2 was generated assuming
a significantly higher (by a factor of 10) probability of transitioning from the normal state
to the stressed state, and Table 5.3 was generated assuming a significantly higher (by a
factor of 2) probability of transitioning from the stressed state to the normal state. The




)T (so that the ‘stressed’






)T . The expected returns and standard deviations of the different payoff structures
appear to be relatively insensitive to the choices of the parameters p1,2, p2,1.
Table 5.2: Expected payoffs (and standard errors in parentheses) for the traditional fee
structure and negative fee structure. X0 = 1, T = 1, α = 20%, p1,2 = 0.1, p2,1 = 0.05, σ1 =
0.1, σ2 = 0.2, Nsim = 5000, H = 0.04, and c = 0.1.
(µ0, µ1) EP[M̃(T )] EP[Ĩ(T )] EP[M(T )] EP[I(T )]
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = −0.05 0.0163(0.0004) 1.0057(0.0022) 0.0164(0.0020) 1.0056(0.0009)
µ0 = 0.15, µ1 = −0.05 0.0181(0.0004) 1.0201(0.0022) 0.0277(0.0021) 1.0104 (0.0009)
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = 0 0.0197(0.0004) 1.0294(0.0023) 0.0374(0.0021) 1.0117(0.0008)
µ0 = 0.15, µ1 = 0 0.0223(0.0004) 1.0452(0.0023) 0.0520(0.0023) 1.0155(0.0008)
S.D. of M̃(T ) S.D. of Ĩ(T ) S.D. of M(T ) S.D. of I(T )
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = −0.05 0.0248 (0.0004) 0.1576 (0.0017) 0.1426 (0.0021) 0.0633 (0.0011)
µ0 = 0.15, µ1 = −0.05 0.0258 (0.0004) 0.1575 (0.0017) 0.1467 (0.0020) 0.0602 (0.0012)
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = 0 0.0266 (0.0004) 0.1597 (0.0016) 0.1507 (0.0020) 0.0581(0.0011)
µ0 = 0.15, µ1 = 0 0.0289 (0.0004) 0.1643 (0.0017) 0.1615 (0.0021) 0.0549 (0.0012)
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Table 5.3: Expected payoffs (and standard errors in parentheses) for the traditional fee
structure and negative fee structure. X0 = 1, T = 1, α = 20%, p1,2 = 0.01, p2,1 = 0.1, σ1 =
0.1, σ2 = 0.2, Nsim = 5000, H = 0.04, and c = 0.1.
(µ0, µ1) EP[M̃(T )] EP[Ĩ(T )] EP[M(T )] EP[I(T )]
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = −0.05 0.0227(0.0003) 1.0771(0.0015) 0.0645 (0.0017) 1.0354(0.0003)
µ0 = 0.15, µ1 = −0.05 0.0308(0.0003) 1.1169(0.0015) 0.1095 (0.0018) 1.0382(0.0002)
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = 0 0.0225(0.0003) 1.0768(0.0015) 0.0637 (0.0017) 1.0356(0.0003)
µ0 = 0.15, µ1 = 0 0.0324(0.0003) 1.1235(0.0015) 0.1179 (0.0018) 1.0381(0.0002)
S.D. of M̃(T ) S.D. of Ĩ(T ) S.D. of M(T ) S.D. of I(T )
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = −0.05 0.0214 (0.0002) 0.1049 (0.0011) 0.1178 (0.0012) 0.0187 (0.0008)
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = −0.05 0.0235 (0.0002) 0.1048 (0.0011) 0.1245 (0.0013) 0.0107 (0.0007)
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = 0 0.0212 (0.0002) 0.1042 (0.0011) 0.1172 (0.0012) 0.0192 (0.0009)
µ0 = 0.15, µ1 = 0 0.0244 (0.0003) 0.1084 (0.0012) 0.1288 (0.0014) 0.0117 (0.0008)
Given the similarity of the investor’s payoff to the payoff of a fixed income investment, it
is interesting to examine the probability of default (i.e. the probability that the investor’s
return will be lower than the promised hurdle rate H), and the recovery rate (i.e. the
fraction of the promised amount X0(1 + H) that is expected to be recovered conditional
upon default having occurred). Simulation results under the regime-switching model for
these quantities are provided in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 (with standard errors of the estimates
in parentheses). Probabilities of default are quite high, ranging from 18% under the best
parameter combination to nearly 30% under the worst parameter set. However, these high
probabilities of default are mitigated by very high expected recovery rates, in the range of
95-96%.
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Table 5.4: Probabilities of default under different parameter assumptions for the regime-
switching model. X0 = 1, T = 1, α = 20%, σ1 = 0.1, σ2 = 0.2, Nsim = 5000, H = 0.04, and
c = 0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Probability of Default
(µ0, µ1) p = 0.01, q = 0.05 p = 0.1, q = 0.05 p = 0.01, q = 0.1
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = −0.05 0.1338 (0.0048) 0.3544 (0.0067) 0.0962 (0.0042)
µ0 = 0.15, µ1 = −0.05 0.0736 (0.0037) 0.3116 (0.0065) 0.0414 (0.0028)
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = 0 0.1248 (0.0047) 0.2968 (0.0065) 0.0914 (0.0041)
µ0 = 0.15, µ1 = 0 0.0586 (0.0033) 0.2604 (0.0062) 0.0430 (0.0029)
Table 5.5: Expected recovery rates under different parameter assumptions for the regime-
switching model. X0 = 1, T = 1, α = 20%, σ1 = 0.1, σ2 = 0.2, Nsim = 5000, H = 0.04, and
c = 0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Recovery Rate
(µ0, µ1) p = 0.01, q = 0.05 p = 0.1, q = 0.05 p = 0.01, q = 0.1
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = −0.05 0.9825 (0.0507) 0.9429 (0.0722) 0.9922 (0.0399)
µ0 = 0.15, µ1 = −0.05 0.9888 (0.0432) 0.9452 (0.0737) 0.9975 (0.0328)
µ0 = 0.1, µ1 = 0 0.9844 (0.0455) 0.9447 (0.0707) 0.9919 (0.0439)
µ0 = 0.15, µ1 = 0 0.9866 (0.0469) 0.9460 (0.0713) 0.9964 (0.0374)
Moreover, the probability of default and the recovery rate can also be solved using a
PDE approach. Define the default probability and expected recovery rate respectively as
follows:
p(t, x, i) = EP[I(Xt ≤ (1 +H)x)|ε(0) = i], (5.7)
R(t, x, i) = EP





By Zhu et al. (2015), Elliott and Siu (2011), and Kennedy (2007), one can obtain a system
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of PDEs for (5.7),




2pxx(t, x, 1) + λ2
(
p(t, x, 2)− p(t, x, 1)
)
= 0, (5.9)




2pxx(t, x, 2) + λ1
(




p(T, x, 1) = p(T, x, 2) = I(x ≤ (1 +H)X0). (5.11)
For (5.8), a simple mathematical derivation yields,
R(t, x, i) = EP





[ EP[XT I(XT ≤ (1 +H)X0)]




EP[XT I(XT ≤ (1 +H)X0)|ε(0) = i]
(1 +H)X0EP[I(XT ≤ (1 +H)X0)|ε(0) = i]
=
EP[XT I(XT ≤ (1 +H)X0)|ε(0) = i]
p(t, x, i)(1 +H)X0
. (5.12)
Again, if we let
q(t, x, i) = EP[XT I(XT ≤ (1 +H)x)|ε(0) = i], (5.13)
then, a similar system of PDEs can be obtained as follows:




2qxx(t, x, 1) + λ2
(
q(t, x, 2)− q(t, x, 1)
)
= 0, (5.14)




2qxx(t, x, 2) + λ1
(




q(T, x, 1) = q(T, x, 2) = xI(x ≤ (1 +H)X0). (5.16)
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5.4.1 Impact of the Manager’s Deposit c
A key parameter for first-loss and negative loss fee structures is the manager’s deposit c,
as it determines the amount of downside protection provided to the investor by the fund
manager. In this section, we investigate the impact of this parameter on the payoffs for the
fund investor and manager. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 present the expected payoffs of the investor
and manager respectively, as the parameter c varies, under the benchmark parameter
set used to generate Table 5.1. We see that for large levels of downside protection, the
investor’s return quickly approaches the promised value H. For lower levels of insurance,
the investor’s expected return becomes negative. The manager’s expected payoff follows
the opposite pattern. Expected payoffs are high for low levels of c, but decrease rapidly as
c increases. Similarly, as illustrated in Figures 5.8 and 5.9, the volatility of the investor’s
payoff decreases quickly as the level of downside protection c increases, and the volatility
of the manager’s payoff increases accordingly. The investor’s Sharpe Ratio as a function of
c is given in Figure 5.10 (the risk-free interest rate is set at r = 1%). For very high levels
of protection c, the Sharpe ratio grows very quickly (as H > r and a very large level of
downside protection virtually guarantees that the investor will receive the return H).





































Figure 5.6: Investor’s expected payoff as a function of the manager’s deposit c. X0 =
1, T = 1, α = 20%, p1,2 = 0.01, p2,1 = 0.05, σ1 = 0.1, σ2 = 0.2, Nsim = 5000, H = 0.04.
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Figure 5.7: Manager’s expected payoff as a function of the manager’s deposit c. X0 =
1, T = 1, α = 20%, p1,2 = 0.01, p2,1 = 0.05, µ1 = 0.1, µ2 = −0.05, σ1 = 0.1, σ2 = 0.2, Nsim =
5000, H = 0.04.
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Figure 5.8: Standard deviation of the investor’s payoff as a function of the manager’s
deposit c. X0 = 1, T = 1, α = 20%, p1,2 = 0.01, p2,1 = 0.05, µ1 = 0.1, µ2 = −0.05, σ1 =
0.1, σ2 = 0.2, Nsim = 5000, H = 0.04.
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Figure 5.9: Standard deviation of the manager’s payoff as a function of the manager’s
deposit c. X0 = 1, T = 1, α = 20%, p1,2 = 0.01, p2,1 = 0.05, µ1 = 0.1, µ2 = −0.05, σ1 =
0.1, σ2 = 0.2, Nsim = 5000, H = 0.04.
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Figure 5.10: Sharpe Ratio of the investor’s payoff as a function of the manager’s deposit
c. X0 = 1, T = 1, α = 20%, p1,2 = 0.01, p2,1 = 0.05, µ1 = 0.1, µ2 = −0.05, σ1 = 0.1, σ2 =
0.2, Nsim = 5000, H = 0.04.
As with many collateralized products, the credit risk of the investor’s payoff is intimately
related to the market risk of the underlying reference portfolio. In the preceding analysis,
we have measured risk using the standard deviations of payoffs and returns. While this is
appropriate for normal distributions, the payoffs of the hedge fund manager and investor are
non-normal, especially in the context of the regime-switching framework. As a consequence,
it is important to consider the tail risks faced by the investor. We will do this by considering
the investor’s expected shortfall (also known as conditional Value-at-Risk, or conditional
tail expectation), the expectation of losses given that the losses are above a given confidence
level of their distribution.
Let
LI = −(I(T )−X0),
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I) = inf{x ∈ R : P[LI ≤ x] ≥ β}. (5.18)
Note that we have a probability mass at the point −HX0. The estimator for expected












N · (1− β)
.
We increase the number of scenarios in the simulation to 1,000,000 in order to have more
scenarios in the tail and a more accurate estimate of expected shortfall. Figure 5.11 shows
the investor’s expected shortfall as a function of the manager’s deposit c for β = 0.95, 0.99.
As expected, lower levels of the manager’s deposit are associated with higher levels of risk.
In particular, for manager deposits near our benchmark level of c = 10%, expected shortfall
can exceed 20% of the initial investment, indicating significant losses for investors under
extreme scenarios. Because of the large number of scenarios used, the confidence intervals
for the estimates are quite small (the lengths of the confidence intervals are around 1.5%
of the estimated values).
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Figure 5.11: Expected shortfall of the investor’s losses as a function of the manager’s
deposit c. X0 = 1, T = 1, α = 20%, p1,2 = 0.01, p2,1 = 0.05, µ1 = 0.1, µ2 = −0.05, σ1 =
0.1, σ2 = 0.2, Nsim = 1, 000, 000, H = 0.04.
5.5 Conclusion
Recently, market pressures have led to the introduction of innovative hedge fund fee struc-
tures, in which the fund manager receives higher performance fees in return for providing
downside protection to fund investors. These arrangements are referred to by the general
name of shared-loss fee structures. An extreme version is the negative fee structure, in
which the manager receives all profits above a pre-defined hurdle rate, and for which the
investor’s position resembles that of an investment in an asset-backed security, with the
underlying assets being the hedge fund’s portfolio. In this chapter we analyzed the negative
fee structure in a regime-switching model, both by pricing it using risk-neutral valuation,
and performing a risk analysis under the real-world measure (including examining the
probability of default and expected recovery rate).
There are a number of important questions that could be considered for future research.
The fee structure could be analyzed under other mathematical models, including those that
allow more general stochastic behaviour of volatility. The incentives of the manager, in
terms of the structuring of the hedge fund portfolio, and the investor, in terms of the deci-
sion to withdraw from the fund, could both be studied, either in isolation (as a stochastic
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control problem and an optimal stopping problem respectively), or together (in a stochastic
game of control and stopping). Finally, the limitations of the assumptions underlying risk-
neutral valuation (particularly the ability to observe the value of, and dynamically trade
in, the underlying assets of the hedge fund) could be investigated, perhaps through models




Conclusion and Directions for Future
Work
In this final chapter, we summarize the original research contributions of this thesis, and
suggest several directions for future research.
6.1 Optimal Stopping Problems for Withdrawal from
Hedge Funds with Alternative Fee Structures
We study the optimal stopping problem arising from an investor determining the best time
to withdraw from a hedge fund investment with a shared-loss fee structure and a positive fee
for assets under management. To be precise, we analyze an optimal stopping problem for
an investor with a piecewise linear payoff function, where the underlying follows a geometric
Brownian motion, corresponding to a hedge fund with a continuous fee for assets under
management deducted (or, equivalently, the price process for a stock paying a continuous
dividend yield). The optimal solution is characterized as the first exit time of the fund
value from a bounded region with upper and lower stopping boundaries. We present a
complete solution of the problem in the infinite horizon case. In the finite horizon case, we
describe the shape of the continuation region, characterize the stopping boundaries using




We study and compare the Sharpe Ratios and Sortino Ratios of hedge fund investors facing
combinations of the first-loss fee structure and traditional fee structure. In particular, we
maximize the Sharpe Ratio or the Sortino Ratio of a portfolio that combines payoffs of the
two fee structures at maturity T . A criterion (4.5) is presented to distinguish whether or
not there exists an interior optimal weight allocation between the two fee structures for the
Sharpe Ratio. Numerical examples are presented for both the Sharpe and Sortino Ratios,
assuming a geometric Brownian motion process for the hedge fund assets. In most cases
we find that the optimal weights are on the boundary points, indicating that one extreme
fee structure is preferred compared to the other, and all possible mixtures. Typically,
the classical fee structure is preferred at very low volatilities, where the insurance in the
first-loss contract is unlikely to be triggered, and at extremely high volatilities, for which
the share of a very large potential upside is important. At intermediate volatilities (often
covering most of the range typically seen in practice), the first-loss structure is preferred,
owing to the importance of its insurance component. We find that there is negligible
benefit to the investor due to “fee diversification,” even in the case when a combination of
fee structures is optimal.
Finally, an extreme version, the negative fee structure is investigated, in which the
manager receives all profits above a pre-defined hurdle rate, and for which the investor’s
position resembles that of an investment in an asset-backed security, with the underlying
assets being the hedge fund’s portfolio. We analyzed the negative fee structure in a regime-
switching model, both by pricing it using risk-neutral valuation, and performing a risk
analysis under the real-world measure (including examining the probability of default and
expected recovery rate).
6.3 Directions for Future Work
6.3.1 Integral Equations
In Chapter 3, we have proven that the exercise boundaries S−(T ) and S+(T ) should de-
crease and increase in T respectively. However, the numerical solutions of the equations
appear to be unstable. In particular, when applying several different numerical methods,
the solutions of (3.31) and (3.32) become ill-behaved, and even non-monotonic near the
infinite horizon exercise boundaries.
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Figure 6.1: Exercise Boundaries of the Investor: Escrow First-Loss Fee Structure with
parameters x = 1, r = 0.05, δ = 0, σ = 0.1, T = 1, A = 0, B = 1, p = 0.5, q = 1, N =
252, Nbino = 5000, where N is the number of time steps for the trapezoidal rule method
and Nbino is the number of time steps for the binomial-tree method.
Figure 6.1 illustrates this loss of monotonicity, comparing numerical solution of the in-
tegral equations using the trapezoid rule against the boundaries calculated from a binomial
tree method, which provides rough estimates for our exercise boundaries. Other numerical
methods, such as Simpson’s rule (Chiarella and Ziogas (2005)) and the gaussian quadrature
rule with polynomial interpolation to smooth the exercise boundaries Kim et al. (2013)
produce similar results. Thus, in the future, we are going to approach the exercise bound-
ary value problem differently. For instance, we can implement the penalty technique to
solve the variational inequality (3.8) numerically. Furthermore, all of our figures indicate
that the exercise boundaries S−(T ) and S+(T ) seem to go to their infinite horizon counter-
parts S1 and S2 very quickly (within 0.25 years). Consequently, an alternative might be to
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employ semi-analytic methods that solve a numerical equation that interpolates between
the asymptotic formula for short time and the infinite horizon solution, as done by Chen
and Chadam (2007) in the case of the American put. Once we have a reliable numerical
method, we then can study how the exercise boundaries depend on the parameters. In
particular, we can investigate the robustness of the parameters.
6.3.2 Empirical Analysis
Another way to extend our work is performing analysis with empirical data. Our moti-
vation is that the investors generally do not know the portfolio positions because of the
low transparency of hedge funds. Moreover, instead of reporting daily returns to the in-
vestors like mutual funds, the hedge managers typically only report monthly returns to
the investors Vogt (2010). Therefore, it is very difficult for investors to keep track of how
successfully the hedge funds are performing. More importantly, investors cannot decide
when to withdraw from the fund based on perfect knowledge of the current value of the
hedge fund assets.
In the future, we would like to come up with a withdrawal rule based on the data
provided by the hedge fund managers and other public sources, so that the investors can
have an objective tool to determine the withdrawal time. Furthermore, we can take the fee
structures into account to see whether various fee structures have an impact on investors’
withdrawal decisions. For instance, one can study whether the first-loss fee structure can
lead investor to a better withdrawal time when the economy is bearish.
6.3.3 Fee Structures
There are a number of important questions related to innovative fee structures that could
be considered for future research. The fee structure could be analyzed under other mathe-
matical models, including those that allow more general stochastic behaviour of volatility.
The incentives of both the manager, in terms of the structuring of the hedge fund portfolio,
and the investor, in terms of the decision to withdraw from the fund, could both be stud-
ied, either in isolation (as a stochastic control problem and an optimal stopping problem
respectively), or together (in a stochastic game of control and stopping). For instance, by
Bayraktar and Huang (2013), we can define the stochastic game as follows. If the investor
acts first:






On the other hand, if the manager acts first:





where c ∈ C is the set of all admissible controls, τ ∈ T[0,t] is the set of all stopping times
if the investor acts first, π[c] ∈ π[0,t] is the set of all stopping times if the manager acts
first, and Xx,ct is the hedge fund dynamic with control strategy c. Generally speaking, such
stochastic game problems are difficult to analyze and solve. However, by assuming some
regularity conditions, we can claim U(x, t) = V (x, t) and the solution of (6.1) or (6.2)
satisfies so-called Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Variational Inequality (Øksendal and Sulem,
2007, Chapter 4, Page 65) in the following:
min{−Vt − inf
c
{LV − rV }, g − V } = 0. (6.3)
It is worth mentioning that, it requires rigorous and thorough mathematical analysis to
prove that U(x, t) or V (x, t) is indeed a unique viscosity solution to the equation (6.3).
Moreover, if such claim can be proved true, then a numerical solution can be obtained.
For example, Forsyth and Labahn (2007) and Huang et al. (2012) proposed piece-wise con-
stant policy and fixed point-policy methods to solve stochastic control and game problems.
However, the authors mention that the convergence for stochastic games is not guaranteed,
which makes it an interesting research topic. Finally, the limitations of the assumptions
underlying risk-neutral valuation (particularly the ability to observe the value of, and dy-
namically trade in, the underlying assets of the hedge fund) could be investigated, perhaps
through models that more realistically represent the bargaining process between principal
(investor) and agent (manager) than those we have discussed this thesis.
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Derivation of Payoff Functions and Value Func-
tions with Arbitrary Initial Investment
For our analysis in Chapters 1, 2, and 3, we assume the initial investment is 1 and claim
that it is without of loss generality. Appendix A.1 is devoted to further clarify our claim.
Let g∗y(x) denote the payoff function and initial investment amount y > 0.
A.1.1 Compensation from an Escrow Account
In this case, the hedge fund manager sets up an escrow account, which is used to cover the
investor’s losses. Here, we use c, 0 < c < 1, a percentage of the initial investment.
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First-Loss
For the first-loss case, the hedge fund manager will compensate all of the investor’s losses
until the escrow amount is exhausted. The payoff function to the investor is
g∗y(x) =

y + (1− α)(x− y), x ≥ y,
y, (1− c)y < x < y,




αy + (1− α)x, x ≥ y,
y, (1− c)y < x < y,
cy + x, x ≤ (1− c)y.
(A.2)
Shared-Loss
For the shared-loss case, the manager covers a proportion θ of the investor’s losses from an
escrow account. If c ≥ θ, which indicates the escrow account cannot be exhausted, then
the payoff to the investor is
g∗y(x) =
{
y + (1− α)(x− y), x ≥ y,
y + (1− θ)(x− y), x < y, (A.3)
=
{
αy + (1− α)x, x ≥ y,
θy + (1− θ)x, x < y. (A.4)
If c < θ, then the payoff to the investor is
g∗y(x) =

αy + (1− α)x, x ≥ y,
θy + (1− θ)x, (1− c
θ
)y < x < y,




A.1.2 Compensation from the Manager’s Own Investment
In this arrangement, the manager invests their own capital into the fund. Let ω ∈ (0, 1) be
the proportion of the investor’s initial investment contributed by the manager. The total
initial investment is thus (1 + ω)y.
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First-Loss
In first-loss structures, the manager’s share of the fund is used to completely cover the




αy + (1− α)x, x ≥ y,
y, 1
1+ω
y < x < y,





Finally, in the shared-loss case the manager has invested the amount ωy in the fund and




αy + (1− α)x, x ≥ y,
θy + (1− θ)x, θ
ω+θ
y < x < y,





Again, under both the first-loss and shared-loss fee structures, the payoff function g∗y(x)
can be written in the following form:
g∗y(x) =

Ay +Bx, 0 ≤ x ≤ κy
qy + (1− q)x, κy ≤ x ≤ y,
py + (1− p)x, y ≤ x,
(A.8)
where B ≥ 1 ≥ q ≥ A ≥ 0, p ∈ (0, 1) and κ = (B − (1 − q))−1(q − A). The detailed




Next, we present the definitions of value functions similar to (1.9) and (1.10), but with
arbitrary initial investment y. First, assume that the investor’s share of the hedge fund
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assets, under the risk-neutral measure Q, satisfies the dynamics:
dX̃xt = (r − δ)X̃xt dt+ σX̃xt dWt, X̃x0 = x, t ≥ 0, (A.9)




Furthermore, let the value function for the infinite horizon case be
V ∗(x; y) = sup
τ∈T
E[e−rτg∗y(X̃xτ )], (A.10)
where T is the set of all stopping times. On the other hand, if the investor has a finite
investment horizon T , then the value function at the current time is
v∗(x, T ; y) = sup
τ∈T[0,T ]
E[e−rτg∗y(X̃xτ )], (A.11)
where τ ∈ T[0,T ] is the set of all stopping times such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ T , and g∗y(x) is the
investor’s payoff function. The key observation is that g∗y(x) = yg(
x
y
) where g(·) is the
payoff function with initial investment 1 of the form (1.6). Recalling that the process with
initial investment 1 is Xxt , then for any stopping time τ ∈ T ,

















Finally, by (1.9) and (A.10),






Similarly, we can easily obtain









Appendix for Chapters 2 and 3
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2.4.1
a. From (2.13),










(1− q)(1−m2)x0 − qm2
)
, (B.1)










(1− q)(m1 − 1)x0 + qm1
)
. (B.2)
Then, we can get
C ′1(x0, 1− q) =
1
m1 −m2
((1− q)(1−m1)(1−m2)x−m10 + qm1m2x−m1−10 ) < 0, (B.3)
C ′2(x0, 1− q) =
1
m1 −m2
((1− q)(m1 − 1)(1−m2)x−m20 − qm1m2x−m2−10 ) > 0. (B.4)
Therefore, C1(x0, 1− q) is decreasing in x0 and C2(x0, 1− q) is increasing in x0. Moreover,
observe that limx0→0C1(x0, 1−q) =∞, limx0→∞C1(x0, 1−q) = 0, limx0→0C2(x0, 1−q) = 0
and limx0→∞C2(x0, 1− q) =∞. Then, we can verify that C1(x0, 1− q) > 0 and C2(x0, 1−
q) > 0 for all x0 ∈ (0,∞). By Remark 2.3.1, we can verify that W (x;x0, 1− q) is a strictly
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convex function on (0,∞). Next, consider
D(x;x1, x2) = W (x;x1, 1− q)−W (x;x2, 1− q)
= C1(x1, 1− q)xm1 + C2(x1, 1− q)xm2 − C1(x2, 1− q)xm1 − C2(x2, 1− q)xm2
= (C1(x1, 1− q)− C1(x2, 1− q))xm1 + (C2(x1, 1− q)− C2(x2, 1− q))xm2 .
(B.5)
By the strict convexity of W (x;x1, 1−q), W (x2;x1, 1−q) > q+(1−q)x2 = W (x2;x2, 1−q).
So, D(x2;x1, x2) > 0. Furthermore, from (B.5),
D′(x;x1, x2) =m1(C1(x1, 1− q)− C1(x2, 1− q))xm1−1
+m2(C2(x1, 1− q)− C2(x2, 1− q))xm2−1 > 0. (B.6)
This implies that D(x;x1, x2) > 0 for all x ≥ x2. That is W (x;x1) > W (x;x2).












(q + (1− q)κ)m1 − κv0
)
. (B.8)
Note that C1(κ, v0) ≥ 0 if and only if v0 − (q + (1 − q)κ)m2 ≥ 0 and C2(κ, v0) ≥ 0 if and
only if (q + (1− q)κ)m1 − κv0 ≥ 0. Then we can easily derive that when
(q + (1− q)κ)m2
κ
≤ v0 ≤
(q + (1− q)κ)m1
κ
,

















1− q + q
κ
)
xm1 > g(x), (B.9)
137
since κ−(m1−1) > 1 and (1− q + q
κ
) > 1. Last, for v0 < v1, consider
D(x; v1, v0) = W (x;κ, v1)−W (x;κ, v0)




κ(v1 − v0)xm1 +
κ−m2
m1 −m2
κ(v0 − v1)xm2 . (B.10)
Then we can easily find








κ(v0 − v1)xm2−1 > 0.
Note that D(κ; v1, v0) = 0, so W (x;κ, v1) > W (x;κ, v0) for x > κ. 
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3.4.1
Considering the inequality a < Xt < b and Wt =
√
tZ where Z is a standard normal
random variable, we can derive

















⇒ d2(x, b, t) < Z < d2(x, a, t). (B.11)
Clearly, from (B.11), we have
EQ[1{a<Xt<b}] = Q[d2(x, b, t) < Z < d2(x, a, t)]
= Φ(d2(x, a, t))− Φ(d2(x, b, t)).
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= xe(r−δ)t(Φ(d1(x, a, t))− Φ(d1(x, b, t))).

B.3 Proof of Lemma 3.4.2
When x < K, we have
C(x,K, T )−max(x−K, 0) = xe−δTΦ(d1(x,K, T ))−Ke−rTΦ(d2(x,K, T )) (B.12)










So, C(x,K, T ) − max(x − K, 0) = o(
√
T ). Next, when x = K, we can apply the Mean
Value Theorem and write,
C(x,K, T )−max(x−K, 0) = xe−δTΦ(d1(x,K, T ))−Ke−rTΦ(d2(x,K, T ))
= xe−δTφ(ξ(T ))σ
√
T + Φ(d2(x,K, T ))(xe
−δT −Ke−rT ).
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for some ξ(T ) ∈ (d2(x,K, T ), d1(x,K, T )). Since x = K, 0 = limT→0+ d2(x,K, T ) ≤













+ 0 = O(
√
T ).
Finally, x > K implies
C(x,K, T )−max(x−K, 0) = xe−δTΦ(d1(x,K, T ))−Ke−rTΦ(d2(x,K, T ))− x+K
= x(e−δTΦ(d1(x,K, T ))− 1) +K(1− e−rTΦ(d2(x,K, T )).















B.4 Proof of Lemma 3.4.3
Part (a). Since f ′′(x) < 0 for x < x2 and f
′′(x) > 0 for x > x2, f
′
1(x) is strictly decreasing
on the interval [a1, x2] and strictly increasing on the interval [x2, b1]. In other words, f
′
1(x2)
attains a local minimum on the interval [a1, b1]. Now, we can prove the uniqueness.
First, suppose no critical point exists on the interval (a1, b1). Then f
′
1(a1) > 0, f
′
1(b1) >
0 and the fact that f ′1(x2) is a local minimum point implies that 0 < f
′
1(x2) ≤ f ′1(x) for
all x ∈ [a1, b1]. So, f1(x) must be strictly increasing. In other words, f1(x) must have a
unique root on the interval (a1, b1) since f1(a1) < 0 and f1(b1) > 0.
Next, suppose there exist points x1 satisfying f
′
1(x1) = 0. Since f
′
1(x2) is a local
minimum, we must have f ′1(x2) ≤ 0. If f ′1(x2) = 0, then condition 2 implies f ′1(x) > 0 for
x ∈ [a1, x2) ∪ (x2, b1], which means f1(x) is strictly increasing for x ∈ [a1, b1]. So, f1(x)
must have a unique root in the interval (a1, b1).




1 denote the two
critical points, and without loss of generality, we assume x∗1 < x
∗∗
1 . Then the Mean-Value
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Theorem implies there must exist some point c1 ∈ (x∗1, x∗∗1 ) such that f ′′1 (c1) = 0. Since
the inflection point is unique, we must have c1 = x2. Therefore, condition 2 implies that
f ′′1 (x
∗
1) < 0. So, f1(x1) attains a local maximum on the interval [a1, x
∗∗
1 ]. Moreover, by
condition 3, it can be easily verified that for all a1 ≤ x ≤ x∗∗1 , f(x) ≤ f(x∗1) < 0. Therefore,
we can conclude that there is no root for f(x) = 0 between a1 and x
∗∗
1 . Meanwhile, the fact
that x2 < x
∗∗
1 implies that f
′′
1 (x) > 0 for x ≥ x∗∗1 . In other words, we must have f ′(x) > 0
for x > x∗∗1 . Also, recalling that f(x
∗∗
1 ) < 0 and f(b1) > 0, f(x) = 0 must attain a unique
root on (x∗∗1 , b1).
Part (b). Suppose there is no root for x ∈ (a2,∞). Then, we must have f(x) > 0
for all x ≥ a2, which contradicts that f(x) ≤ 0 for x ≥ b2. Thus, we can claim that
f(x) = 0 must have at least one root. Next, suppose x∗2 and x
∗∗
2 are two distinct roots
on the interval (a2,∞) such that f(x∗2) = 0, f(x∗∗2 ) = 0 and x∗2 < x∗∗2 . Then, the Mean
Value Theorem implies that there exists f ′(c2) = 0 for some c2 ∈ (x∗2, x∗∗2 ). Noting that
f(x) is strictly convex, it can be easily verified that f ′(x∗∗2 ) > 0. Thus, for some constant
b∗2 > x
∗∗
2 , we have f(x) > 0 for all x ≥ b∗2. This contradicts the fact that f(x) ≤ 0 for all
x ≥ b2. Thus, we must have a unique root x∗ on the interval (a2,∞) satisfying f(x∗) = 0. 
B.5 Proof of Lemma 3.4.6
Proof. Note that V is increasing and Lipschitz continuous in x (uniformly on any [0, T̄ ]) by
Touzi (2013, Proposition 4.7, pages 46-47). Let x, y ∈ (S−(T ), Se−(T )) with x ≥ y. By the
Dynamic Programming Principle (Touzi (2013, page 41)), for any stopping time θ ∈ T[0,T ]
v(x, T ) = sup
τ∈T[0,T ]
E[1τ<θe−rτg(Xxτ ) + 1τ≥θe−rθV (T − θ,Xxθ )]
so that
V (x, T )− V (y, T ) ≤ sup
τ∈T[0,T ]
E[1τ<θe−rτ (g(Xxτ )− g(Xyτ ))
+ 1τ≥θe




θ = inf{t > 0, Xxt = 1 or X
y
t = κ}, (B.16)
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to obtain:
V (x, T )−V (y, T ) ≤ (x−y)(1−q)+C(x−y)Q(θ ≤ τ) ≤ (x−y)(1−q)+C(x−y)Q(θ ≤ T ).
where C is the Lipschitz constant of V , and we have suppressed the dependence of θ on x
and y. Take η > κ. Then since S−(T )→ 1, for T small enough
θ ≥ θ̄ = inf{t > 0, XS
e
−(T )
t = 1 or X
η
t = κ} (B.17)
and θ̄ does not depend on the choice of x, y. Thus:
V (x, T )− V (y, T )
x− y
≤ (1− q) + CQ(θ̄ ≤ T ). (B.18)
The final term is bounded by the constant C multiplied by the sum of the probabilities
that the process X started at η hits κ before T , and that X started at Se−(T ) hits 1 before
T . Both of these probabilities can be shown to be o(1) using the explicit form of the hitting
time distribution of a geometric Brownian motion (the first trivially, and the second using
the estimate (3.51)). The proof for x, y ∈ (Se+(T ), S+(T )) is similar.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 4
C.1 Derivation of the Condition for an Interior Opti-
mum in the Sharpe Ratio Maximization Problem
Introduce the notation
µ1 = E[g1(XxT )], µ2 = E[g2(XxT )],
σ1 = Var[g1(X
x








From (4.3), we can write,














Here, the investor seeks to maximize the Sharpe Ratio SR(ω) in (4.4). As a result, the
investor is solving the following optimization problem:
max
ω
ω′µ− (1 + r)x√
ω′Σω
subject to ω′1 = 1,
ω ≥ 0. (C.3)
First, we can simplify (C.3) by considering the payoff functions:
g̃1(X
x
T ) = g1(X
x
T )− (1 + r)x, (C.4)
g̃2(X
x
T ) = g2(X
x
T )− (1 + r)x. (C.5)
Then, we can easily verify that
µ̃1 = E[g̃1(XxT )] = µ1 − (1 + r)x, µ̃2 = E[g̃2(XxT )] = µ2 − (1 + r)x,
σ̃21 = Var[g̃1(X
x






T )] = σ
2




T )] = σ12.





subject to ω′1 = 1,













Now, we can rewrite (C.6) as a standard quadratic programming problem if we assume
µ̃1 > 0 and µ̃2 > 0. This is a natural assumption here because the investor anticipates
a higher expected return than the risk-free rate when investing in the hedge fund. If we
let f(ω) denote the objective function in (C.6), then it can be verified that for any real







subject to ω′µ̃ = 1,
ω ≥ 0. (C.8)




subject to ω′µ̃ = 1,
ω ≥ 0. (C.9)
which is a standard quadratic programming problem.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.1:
Proof. By Best (2010, Chapter 9, Page 192), we can obtain the following optimality con-
ditions for (C.9), 
ω′µ̃ = 1,





where ν is the multiplier for the constraint ω′µ̃ = 1 and λ is the vector of multipliers for
the constraints ω ≥ 0. More explicitly, this leads to the linear system:
ω1µ̃1 + ω2µ̃2 = 1, (C.11)
λ1 − 2ω1σ̃21 − 2ω2σ̃12 = νµ̃1, (C.12)
λ2 − 2ω1σ̃12 − 2ω2σ̃22 = νµ̃2, (C.13)
λ1ω1 + λ2ω2 = 0, (C.14)
with constraints ω ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0. The constraints imply the solution to (C.14) must
satisfy one of the following three cases: (i) λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0, (ii) λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0, (iii)
λ1 = 0 and λ2 > 0.
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Subject to ω′µ̃ = 1. (C.15)
Let ω∗∗ = (w∗∗1 , w
∗∗












where C∗ = (µ̃1σ̃2 − µ̃2σ̃1)2 + 2µ̃1µ̃2(σ̃1σ̃2 − σ̃12). This is the solution to (C.9) without
the constraint ω ≥ 0. Therefore, ω∗ = ω∗∗ when ω∗∗ is a feasible solution to (C.9).
Next, note that C∗ > 0, so ω∗∗ is feasible for (C.9) if and only if µ̃1σ̃
2
2 − µ̃2σ̃12 ≥ 0 and
µ̃2σ̃
2











Next, if (C.17) is not satisfied, then the optimal solution is the solution in either case (ii)
or case (iii). Clearly, case (ii) leads to ω2 = 0, and from (C.11), it is easy to calculate
ω1 = 1/µ̃1. On the other hand, ω1 = 0 and ω2 = 1/µ̃2 is the solution for case (iii). Finally,
we substitute the solutions in case (ii) and (iii) back into the objective function in (C.9)
and compare their values to obtain the optimal solution. This yields ω∗ = (1/µ̃1, 0) if
σ̃21/µ̃
2
1 ≤ σ̃22/µ̃22, otherwise, ω∗ = (0, 1/µ̃2). 
To investigate the nature of the investor’s optimal strategy in terms of the original
model parameters, we need to write µ̃1, µ̃2, σ̃1, σ̃2, σ̃12 explicitly. Following Djerroud et al.
(2016) we assume m1 = m2 = m. Introducing the notation:
C1 := E[(XxT −mx− x)+], C2 := E[(XxT −mx− x)2+],
P1 := E[(x+mx−XxT )+], P2 := E[(x+mx−XxT )2+],
P1,c := E[((1− c)x+mx−XxT )+], P2,c := E[((1− c)x+mx−XxT )2+],
146
we obtain:
µ̃1 = (1− α1)C1 − P1 − rx, (C.18)
µ̃2 = (1− α2)C1 − P1,c − rx, (C.19)
σ̃21 = Var[(1− α1)(XxT −mx− x)+ − (x+mx−XxT )+ − rx]
= (1− α1)2(C2 − C21) + P2 − P 21 + 2(1− α1)C1P1, (C.20)
σ̃22 = Var[(1− α2)(XxT −mx− x)+ − ((1− c)x+mx−XxT )+ − rx]
= (1− α2)2(C2 − C21) + P2,c − P 21,c + 2(1− α2)C1P1,c. (C.21)
σ̃12 = E[g̃1(XxT )g̃2(XxT )]− µ̃1µ̃2
= (1− α1)(1− α2)C2 − (1− α1)rxC1 − (1− α2)rxC1 + P2,c + cxP1,c
+ rxP1 + rxP1,c + r
2x2 − µ̃1µ̃2. (C.22)
Hence, SR1, SR2 and ρ can be obtained. Next, Recalling that µ̃1 > 0 and µ̃2 > 0, we can
obtain the valid ranges for α1 and α2 from (C.18) and (C.19):
α1 <
C1 − P1 − rx
C1
:= α∗1, α2 <
C1 − P1,c − rx
C1
:= α∗2. (C.23)
By (C.23) and noting that P1 ≥ P1,c, we can easily deduce that α∗1 ≤ α∗2. This is reasonable,
because the first-loss fee structure provides downside protection for the investor. In return,
the investor can tolerate a higher performance fee.
C.2 Sortino Ratio Maximization
From (4.8) and noting that r(T ) = g(XxT )/x− 1, we can easily obtain





− 1− l, 0}2]
= x−2E[min{g(XxT )− (1 + l)x, 0}2]. (C.24)









E[g(XxT )]− (1 + l)x√
E[min{g(XxT )− (1 + l)x, 0}2]
. (C.25)
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Recall that g(XxT ) = ω1g1(X
x
T ) + ω2g2(X
x
T ) and let
g̃1,l(X
x
T ) = g1(X
x
T )− (1 + l)x and g̃2,l(XxT ) = g2(XxT )− (1 + l)x.







T ) = ω1g̃1,l(X
x
T ) + ω2g̃2,l(X
x
T ). Now, introduce the notation:
µ1,l := E[g̃1,l(XxT )], µ1,l := E[g̃2,l(XxT )],





σ12,l(ω) := E[g̃1,l(XxT )g̃2,l(XxT )1{g̃l(XxT )≤0}], (C.27)
and note that
E[min{g̃l(XxT ), 0}2] =E[g̃l(XxT )21{g̃l(XxT )≤0}]
=E[(ω1g̃1,l(XxT ) + ω2g̃2,l(XxT ))21{g̃l(XxT )≤0}]
=ω21E[g̃1,l(XxT )21{g̃l(XxT )≤0}]
+ 2ω1ω2E[g̃1,l(XxT )g̃2,l(XxT )1{g̃l(XxT )≤0}]
+ ω22E[g̃2,l(XxT )21{g̃l(XxT )≤0}]. (C.28)
We can rewrite (C.26) as
SOR(ω) =
ω1µ1,l + ω2µ1,l




Similar to the Sharpe Ratio maximization framework in the previous section, the investor’s
goal is to maximize SOR(ω) at maturity T . In general, the expression (C.29) is difficult
to optimize analytically.
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C.3 Derivation of Explicit Formulas
Assuming m1 = m2 = m, we rewrite the investor payoffs g̃1(X
x
T ) and g̃2(X
x
T ) in the










T −mx− α2(XxT −mx− x)+ + (x+mx−XxT )+
− ((1− c)x+mx−XxT )+ − (1 + r)x.




T ) =(1− α1)(XxT −mx− x)+ − (x+mx−XxT )+ − rx, (C.30)
g̃2(X
x
T ) =(1− α2)(XxT −mx− x)+ − ((1− c)x+mx−XxT )+ − rx. (C.31)




2 then follow immediately. Moreover, noting that
(x+mx−XxT )+((1− c)x+mx−XxT )+ = ((1− c)x+mx−XxT )2+ + cx((1− c)x+mx−XxT )+
yields:
σ̃12 = E[g̃1(XxT )g̃2(XxT )]− µ̃1µ̃2
=(1− α1)(1− α2)C2 − (1− α1)rxC1 − (1− α2)rxC1 + P2,c + cxP1,c
+ rxP1 + rxP1,c + r










T −mx− α2(XxT −mx− x)+ + (x+mx−XxT )+
− ((1− c)x+mx−XxT )+ − (1 + l)x.
Similarly, we can write g̃1,l(X
x
T ) and g̃2,l(X
x
T ) as follows,
g̃1,l(X
x
T ) =(1− α1)(XxT −mx− x)+ − (x+mx−XxT )+ − lx, (C.33)
g̃2,l(X
x
T ) =(1− α2)(XxT −mx− x)+ − ((1− c)x+mx−XxT )+ − lx. (C.34)
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It is easy to check g̃l(X
x
T ) ≤ 0⇒ ω1g̃1,l(XxT ) + ω2g̃2,l(XxT ) ≤ 0, which implies that
(ω1(1− α1) + ω2(1− α2)) (XxT −mx− x)+
≤ ω1(x+mx−XxT )+ + ω2((1− c)x+mx−XxT )+ + lx. (C.35)
When XxT ≤ (1 + m)x, the inequality (C.35) always holds. On the other hand, when
XxT > (1 +m)x, we can easily obtain
(ω1(1− α1) + ω2(1− α2)) (XxT −mx− x) ≤ lx
⇒ XxT ≤
l
ω1(1− α1) + ω2(1− α2)
x+ (1 +m)x = (1 + a+m)x, (C.36)
where a = l/ω1(1 − α1) + ω2(1 − α2). Therefore, we have that g̃l(XxT ) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ XxT ≤
(1 + a+m)x. It follows that
E[min{g̃l(XxT ), 0}2] =E[g̃l(XxT )21{g̃l(XxT )≤0}]
=E[(ω1g̃1,l(XxT ) + ω2g̃2,l(XxT ))21{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}]
=ω21E[g̃1,l(XxT )21{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}]
+ 2ω1ω2E[g̃1,l(XxT )g̃2,l(XxT )1{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}]
+ ω22E[g̃2,l(XxT )21{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}]. (C.37)
Introducing the notation:
C l0 := E[1{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}],
C l1 := E[(XxT −mx− x)+1{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}],
C l2 := E[(XxT −mx− x)2+1{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}],
P l1,c := E[((1− c)x+mx−XxT )+1{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}],
P l2,c := E[((1− c)x+mx−XxT )2+1{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}],
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by (C.33) and (C.34), we can obtain
µ1,l =(1− α1)C1 − P1 − lx, µ1,l = (1− α2)C1 − P1,c − lx,
σ1,l(ω) =E[g̃1,l(XxT )21{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}]
=E[((1− α1)(XxT −mx− x)+ − (x+mx−XxT )+ − lx)
2 1{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}].
=(1− α1)2C l2 + P l2,0 + l2x2C l0 − 2(1− α1)lxC l1 + 2lxP l1,0.
σ2,l(ω) =E[g̃2,l(XxT )21{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}]
=E[((1− α2)(XxT −mx− x)+ − ((1− c)x+mx−XxT )+ − lx)
2 1{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}]
= (1− α2)2C l2 + P l2,c + l2x2C l0 − 2(1− α2)lxC l1 + 2lxP l1,c
σ12,l(ω) =E[g̃1,l(XxT )g̃2,l(XxT )1{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}]
= (1− α1)(1− α2)C l2 − (1− α1)lxC l1 − (1− α2)lxC l1 + P l2,c + cxP l1,c




In order to derive explicit formulas for Ci, Pi, Pi,c, P
l
i,c, i = 1, 2 and C
l
j, j = 0, 1, 2, we
need the following result.
Proposition C.3.1. Let Xxt = x exp{(µ− 12σ
2)t− σWt}. Then, for 0 ≤ a ≤ b,
E[(Xxt )21{a<Xxt <b}] = x
2e2µt+σ
2t(Φ(d̃1(x, a, t))− Φ(d̃1(x, b, t))). (C.38)
Proof. Let Z = t−1/2Wt ∼ N(0, 1),
d1(x, y, t) =



























⇐⇒ d2(x, b, t) < Z < d2(x, a, t). (C.39)
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E[(Xxt )21{a<Xxt <b}] =
∫ d2(x,a,t)
d2(x,b,t)

































2t(Φ(d̃1(x, a, t))− Φ(d̃1(x, b, t))),
where
d̃1(x, y, t) =








To simplify notation, we define
d̃1(x, bx, T ) := d̃1(b), d1(x, bx, T ) := d1(b),
d2(x, bx, T ) := d2(b).















C l0 = E[1{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}] = Φ(−d2((1 +m+ a)))
C1 = E[(XxT − x−mx)+] = xeµTΦ(d1(1))− (1 +m)xΦ(d2(1)),
C l1 = E[(XxT −mx− x)+1{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}]
= xeµT (Φ(d1((1 +m))− Φ(d1((1 +m+ a))) + (1 +m)x(Φ(d2((1 +m))− Φ(d2((1 +m+ a)))
C2 = E[(XxT − x−mx)2+]
= x2e2µT+σ
2TΦ(d̃1(1))− 2(1 +m)x2eµTΦ(d1(1)) + (1 +m)2x2Φ(d2(1)),
C l2 = E[(XxT −mx− x)2+1{XxT≤(1+a+m)x}]
= x2e2µT+σ
2T (Φ(d̃1((1 +m))− Φ(d̃1((1 +m+ a)))
− 2(1 +m)x2eµT (Φ(d1((1 +m))− Φ(d1((1 +m+ a))))
+ (1 +m)2x2(Φ(d2((1 +m))− Φ(d2((1 +m+ a)))
P1 = P1,0 = (1 +m)xΦ(−d2(1))− xeµTΦ(−d1(1)),
P l1,0 = P1,0 = (1 +m)xΦ(−d2(1))− xeµTΦ(−d1(1))
P2 = P2,0 = (1 +m)
2x2Φ(−d2(1))− 2(1 +m)x2eµTΦ(−d1(1)) + x2e2µT+σ
2TΦ(−d̃1(1)),
P l2,0 = P2,0 = (1 +m)
2x2Φ(−d2(1))− 2(1 +m)x2eµTΦ(−d1(1)) + x2e2µT+σ
2TΦ(−d̃1(1)),
P1,c = E[((1− c)x+mx−XxT )+]
= (1− c+m)xΦ(−d2(1− c))− xeµTΦ(−d1(1− c)),
P l1,c = P1,c
= (1− c+m)xΦ(−d2(1− c))− xeµTΦ(−d1(1− c)),
P2,c = E[((1− c)x+mx−XxT )2+]
= (1− c+m)2x2Φ(−d2(1− c))− 2(1− c+m)x2eµTΦ(−d1(1− c)) + x2e2µT+σ
2TΦ(−d̃1(1− c)).
P l2,c = P2,c
= (1− c+m)2x2Φ(−d2(1− c))− 2(1− c+m)x2eµTΦ(−d1(1− c)) + x2e2µT+σ
2TΦ(−d̃1(1− c)).
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C.4 Derivation of Risk-Neutral Indifferent Performance
Fee
Let
V1 = EQ[e−rTg1(XxT )] (C.41)
be the risk-neutral value of the investor for the traditional fee structure, and let
V2 = EQ[e−rTg2(XxT )] (C.42)




T ) = (1− α1)(XxT −mx− x)+ − (x+mx−XxT )+ + x, (C.43)
g2(X
x
T ) = (1− α2)(XxT −mx− x)+ − ((1− c)x+mx−XxT )+ + x. (C.44)
Then, the Black-Scholes formula can be used to derive V1 and V2 as follows:
V1 = (1− α1)C(x, (1 +m)x)− P (x, (1 +m)x) + e−rTx, (C.45)
V2 = (1− α2)C(x, (1 +m)x)− P (x, (1− cx+m)x) + e−rTx, (C.46)
where C(x,K) is the Black-Scholes price of a call option on a non-dividend paying asset
with current value of the underlying x and strike price K, and P (x,K) is the Black-Scholes
put option price with the same parameters as arguments.
Finally, we can set V1 = V2. Then, a risk-neutral indifferent performance fee α2 can be
obtained:
(1− α1)C(x, (1 +m)x)− P (x, (1 +m)x) + e−rTx
= (1− α2)C(x, (1 +m)x)− P (x, (1− cx+m)x) + e−rTx
⇒ (α2 − α1)C(x, (1 +m)x) = P (x, (1 +m)x)− P (x, (1− cx+m)x)
α2 = α1 +
P (x, (1 +m)x)− P (x, (1− cx+m)x)
C(x, (1 +m)x)
. (C.47)
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